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Abstract 
Perhaps unique in the world is the Dutch practice of calculating the effect of political 
manifestos by (government) expert institutes. The first expert institute to do this was the 
Central Planning Bureau, which predicted the economic effects of full implementation of 
election manifestos. These 'calculations' function as a seal of (dis-)approval in the public 
debate in election time: the CPB tends to predict for each party the future development 
of important indicators such as unemployment, government debt, etc. Mimicking this 
practice at the request of various political parties, the Institute for Public Health and the 
Environment (RIVM) started calculating the environmental effects of election manifes-
tos in 1994 and repeated this exercise in 1998 and 2002. This paper describes the inter-
action between political parties and RIVM experts in 2002 and provides an attempt to  
uncover the relationship with the political parties that RIVM experts had in this particu-
lar instance. A model describing four possible interactions between politics and science 
is used. The conclusion is that in terms of this model, the RIVM/politics interaction in 
the calculation of election manifestoes can best be described as technocracy. 
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1. Boundary work 
1.1 Essentialists’ perspective on the relation between science and 
politics: knowledge utilization 
Many scholars have problematized the relation between science and policy. Science and 
policy are seen as different cultures with different goals, interests, rationalities, responsi-
bilities, quality criteria, jargon etc. (e.g. Caplan 1979; Rich 1991). Authors that can be 
grouped under the label of the so-called knowledge utilization studies1 use essentialist 
and universal criteria to make distinctions between the domains of science and policy. 
Knowledge utilization implies that politicians use the scientific knowledge provided by 
scientists. There are relatively straightforward criteria for evaluating the science/policy 
interaction. Scientific knowledge was to be scientifically sound, objective and unbiased, 
and was to be properly communicated to the policy makers. This results in standard  
images of science and policy that seem almost mutually exclusive (see table below). 
Policy Science 
Values Facts 
Interests Neutral, disinterested, independent 
Subjective Objective 
Ideology Truth 
Opportunistic, bargaining, negotiations Standardized methodology 
 
1.2 Constructivists: attention to boundaries 
The relation between science and policy has also been analyzed from a social construc-
tivist perspective (e.g. Jasanoff 1990; Halffman 2003; Turnhout 2003a). Authors from 
this line do not refer to universal criteria and standard images but acknowledge, as Miller 
(2001) has put it, that science and policy can be understood as labels for distinct forms of 
life. Although authors from this perspective deny the existence of universal boundaries 
between science and policy and of essentialist criteria to base that demarcation on, they 
do not deny differences and boundaries as such. Their main argument, following Gieryn 
(1983; 1995), is that the drawing of boundaries, referred to as boundary work, is a strate-
gic and context specific activity. That is, different actors use different criteria to draw 
boundaries in different places in different contexts and for different reasons. In that 
sense, boundaries can be seen as real and do become institutionalized in certain routines, 
rules standard procedures, and conceptualizations (Halffman & Hoppe 2004). However, 
boundaries do not come out of the blue, but are forged through human activity (‘bound-
ary work’/’boundary traffic’, ibid; Hoppe, 2002). 
                                                   
1
  For elaboration on the knowledge utilization perspective see for instance Turnhout 2003b; 
Turnhout & Leroy 2004 or Halffman & Hoppe 2004. 
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Boundary work includes activities that are undertaken to demarcate science from poli-
tics, but also the activities that are undertaken to coordinate the activities in the two 
spheres. Starting point is the fact that scientists do not just provide policy makers with 
instrumental knowledge, but also with strategic advice, new ideas for how to define 
problems and goals, with help in structuring policy debates, and with political support 
when needed (Halffman, 2003). The degree to which this occurs says something about 
the boundary between science and politics. As a result the boundaries may stay relatively 
clear, but sometimes they become blurred. The interest is then to “show how boundaries 
are drawn, how these patterns vary under different conditions, and what the conse-
quences of various patterns are” (Halffman, 2003). 
The relevant conditions that shape boundary work – at least in the sphere of regulatory 
policy (ibid.) – include the relations between societal actors, the demarcation of regula-
tory tasks, and the pattern of involvement of legal institutions. In the context of such 
broad macro conditions scientists and politicians are dependent on each other in various 
ways. Expertise can for instance help politicians in providing relatively stable points of 
reference in decision-making. Politicians can help experts by stimulating the emergence 
of certain areas of expertise by funding research programs. 
1.3 The effectiveness of science politics interactions 
Authors from both the knowledge utilization school and the constructivist perspective 
have been concerned with the issue of how and under what circumstances science can 
play an effective role in policy. In many cases a special type of knowledge production 
has been suggested that should be able to effectively mediate between science and pol-
icy. 
Weinberg (1972) has put forward transscience as a way to deal with societal questions 
concerning risk analysis. Funtowicz & Ravetz (1993) have proposed post normal science 
to solve current complex problems. Jasanoff (1990) has suggested the concept of regula-
tory science to describe the kind of science that is able to produce ‘serviceable truths’, 
which satisfy tests of scientific acceptability and support reasoned decision-making. 
These concepts have one commonality in that they refer to types of knowledge produc-
tion that have a firm grounding in science but differ from what is generally understood as 
science in their explicit mission for usability. Furthermore, the cited authors seem to rec-
ognize that this might have consequences for scientific validity. Funtowicz & Ravetz 
(1996) state that for dealing with current complex problems “science cannot usually pro-
vide well founded theories, based on experiments, for explanation and prediction”.  
According to Jasanoff (1990), “the guidelines for validating science in the regulatory 
context tend to be fluid, controversial and arguably more politically motivated than 
those applicably to university-based scienc”. Weinberg (1985; quoted in Jasanoff 1990) 
is most explicit in his recognition of a trade off between usability and scientific validity 
when he writes that for transscience (in this publication Weinberg writes about regula-
tory science, which can be regarded as synonymous to his earlier concept of 
transscience) “the norms of proof are less demanding than are the norms in ordinary  
science”. 
Regardless which perspective and whether science and policy are seen as essentially  
different domains or as distinct forms of life separated by strategically drawn, context 
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dependent boundaries, the development of concepts such as transscience, post normal 
science and regulatory science reflects the desire for a science that is useful in policy and 
to have effective interactions between science and policy. 
The conclusion that expert advice and policy are ‘co-constructed’ leads to a desire for 
new criteria to judge the science/policy interaction by (Halffman, 2003). These criteria 
include: the selective consideration of knowledge, the treatment of competing scientific 
approaches, and the exclusion of viable policy options a priori (Hoppe, 2002). Whether 
or not a certain trajectory of science/policy interaction can be considered a success in 
terms of the just mentioned criteria depends on different conceptions that the actors  
involved hold of them (Halffman and Hoppe, 2004). Hoppe (2002) has proposed that 
eight ‘repertoires’ or models or visions on the division of labor between science and 
politics exist. These repertoires, perhaps best understood in the sense of story lines  
(Hajer, 1995), indicate what should be the role of scientists and how they must relate to 
policy makers. 
1.4 Discourses on the science-politics interface 
The models differ in their assumptions on primacy (either for science or for politics) and 
the functions of science and politics (divergent or convergent logics). The four most  
extreme repertoires - to which I limit myself here for reasons of readability - are summa-
rized in the table (based on Hoppe, 2002). The four other models are less extreme com-
binations on the primacy/convergence axes, with opportunities for dialogue rather than 
purely primacy. 
 Primacy Divergent/ 
convergent 
Explanation 
‘Enlightment’ Science Divergent Science leads to the progress of objective knowledge. Policy should 
be based on it, but scientists reject the responsibility for this.  
Normative issues left to politics. Respecting scientific disciplines 
solves conflicts between types of knowledge. Scientists distrust 
politics, no place for policy-orientated learning. 
‘Technocratic’ Science Convergent Scientifically trained persons should hold key positions in govern-
ment or should de facto hold power. Depoliticization is key. Values 
are dealt with by reducing them to objectively measurable progress 
or decline, or by interpreting value statements as ‘merely’ emotional 
statements. Lay knowledge is not credible, scientists free to impose 
their understanding of the good on other. Uncertainty should be 
dealt with by quantitative and probabilistic tools. No political action 
should be taken until research has shed light on issues. Politics  
generates legitimacy for the scientifically based policy. 
‘Classical  
bureaucratic’ 
Politics Divergent Knowledge workers are hired at the service of political power. 
Value issues are a political prerogative. Value statements are step 
by step translated into rules and instructions for implementing  
bodies. Research supports instrumental learning by the bureaucracy. 
Conflicting knowledge claims are solved by specialization or turf. 
Experts are part of the bureaucracy and enjoy privileged access to 
information. Citizens can exercise influence by electing the political 
elite. Uncertainty needs to be tamed by rule making and enforce-
ment. Research and development work is ensnared in hierarchical 
planning and control mechanisms. 
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‘Engineering’ Politics Convergent Research is a social technology for the planned construction of  
society. Knowledge and knowledge workers do not need to be  
incorporated in state institutions. Political leaders articulate  
knowledge questions and assign research projects to experts. 
Knowledge engineers apply existing bodies of knowledge for  
solving local problems. In case of conflicting knowledge claims, the 
state can distance itself. Incrementalistic approach to problem  
solving, trial and error. 
 
1.5 Institutionalization and structuration 
Having outlined these four basic discourses, one may ask how to use these in the analy-
sis of actual boundary work in an empirical sense. My personal interest (see a.o. 
Huitema, 2002) is in two aspects of these discourses, which are called institutionalization 
and structuration (also see Hajer, 1995). I shall be looking at one specific locus of 
boundary work for institutionalization in the sense that the formal and working rules that 
are supposed to guide the behavior of participants in ongoing boundary work there  
reflect either of these discourses. For my analysis of rules, I will use some of the types as 
developed by Ostrom (1986). I will mainly look at ‘boundary rules’ that determine who 
is in and who is out of the exercise, and by which conditions. Then I will pay attention to 
‘authority rules’ that prescribe who can take which actions, how actions are ordered, proc-
essed, and terminated (i.e. competencies). And thirdly, I will discuss ‘information rules’ 
that establish information channels, state the conditions under which they are open or 
closed, create an official language, and prescribe how evidence is to be processed. After 
having analyzed institutionalization of discourses I will assess whether these rules actu-
ally structure behavior of the participants, or alternatively whether the participants  
behave very differently in reality. Before detailing what will be the locus of boundary 
work that I analyze, I first introduce the way I see the connection between the four dis-
courses and the just described rules. 
1.6 Connecting discourses and institutional arrangements 
For enlightment thinkers, usability of scientific findings is automatic, because science  
relates how the state of the world is. Politicians should therefore base their decisions on 
the most recent scientific insights. However, this is their responsibility in the minds of 
enlightment thinkers, not the role of experts as they purchase their own research interests 
and act independently. In addition, science is value free and if value issues are at stake, it 
is up to politicians to decide. So in terms of boundary rules, enlightment thinkers argue 
for a clear separation between politics and science. Science must be (curiosity) self-
steering, not policy driven. In terms of information rules, politicians and experts are sup-
posed to have separate contributions: experts contribute facts, and politicians values. In 
terms of authority rules, boundary work - in the sense of connecting scientific findings 
and policy conclusions - is considered the work of politicians. 
For technocratic thinkers, there should be little separation between experts and politics. 
In fact, they consider expertise so useful for government policy that they feel that experts 
(authority rule) should hold powerful positions and that the role of the remaining politi-
cians is to gather support for policies (information rule). As an information rule, value 
statements are considered merely emotional and should be translated to objectively 
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measurable units, which can be used to optimize decisions (utilitarian thinking). As a 
boundary rule, science is supposed to develop independently from politics, and the flow 
of information (information rule) is one-sided, from experts to politics. In terms of 
boundaries, technocratic thinkers see very little distinction between politicians and  
experts. In fact, one considers it necessary that politicians are experts (authority rule). 
Decisions are to be based on scientific knowledge (information rule), and what is left as 
a pure political task is the one of gathering support for the solutions that are chosen 
(boundary rule, authority rule). 
Classical bureaucratic thinkers do not see a great role for scientific independence 
(boundary rule). In fact, experts are to be subject to hierarchic control (authority rule), 
and the purpose of research would be to facilitate learning by the government (informa-
tion rule). Research should not touch upon value issues, as these are the prerogative of 
politicians (boundary rule). When politicians make value statements, experts should help 
translate them into rules and instructions for (the rest of) the bureaucracy (authority 
rule). The possibility of different knowledge claims is acknowledged, but will be solved 
by determining who is the appropriate organization in a certain matter (boundary rule, 
authority rule). 
Thinkers in the line of engineering see no independent role for experts (boundary rule). 
Rather, they should engage with the politicians in a process of collective problem solv-
ing (authority rule). The common goal is the construction of a certain type of society that 
needs to be attained by measures taken in an experimental fashion (social engineering). 
Politicians steer this process (boundary rule) and expertise is assumed to be very usable 
(information rule). 
I will use the just discussed theoretical notions on boundary work to reflect upon the 
work that the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) has done 
in calculating elections manifestoes. Before that, I will describe existing insight in the 
process of manifesto calculation, some bits of the relevant context and then the way the 
RIVM has gone about calculating election manifestoes. 
1.7 The Dutch RIVM as the locus of boundary work 
In the Netherlands, there is a tradition to produce scientific assessments and evaluations 
of policy to inform policy makers that can be studied productively from the perspective 
just sketched. Many organizations, including advisory councils and so called planning 
bureaus engage in this activity (for an overview see Halffman & Hoppe 2003). This 
documents illuminates the practice of involving planning bureaus in making government 
policy. The focus will be on one particular planning bureau and one of their activities 
more specifically. 
The planning bureaus are small (hundreds of officials at most) subsets of the public  
bureaucracy, but relatively influential. Started in the aftermath of the Second World War 
and originally intended (by social democrats) as a key ingredient in a plan led economy, 
they have evolved to locations where experts with scientific training collect and interpret 
scientific data and make them applicable to public policy. The Dutch economy is  
nowhere near a plan led economy, yet the planning bureaus (one for the economy (CPB), 
one for social and cultural affairs (SCP), one for environment and nature (RIVM) and 
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one for Land Use Planning (RPB)), have an important status in the corporatist and bar-
gaining traditions of Dutch government. 
The planning bureaus play a key role in establishing the facts that need to be taken into 
account when politicians – often in close cooperation with interests groups - make public 
policy. What’s more, they play an active role in shaping public policy by judging policy 
proposals that are made by said parties. This document is not so much on the institu-
tional and cultural background of this phenomenon, which is probably in the high degree 
of corporatism that characterizes Dutch policy making. Rather, I wish to introduce the 
reader to the practices by one of these planning bureaus, specifically the one that focuses 
on environmental and nature issues, the National Institute for Public Health and the  
Environment (RIVM)2. 
This planning bureau is involved in several different activities that should perhaps be  
explained so that the reader obtains a feel for the meaning of the term planning bureau. 
On a yearly basis, the RIVM reports the state of nature and environmental quality and 
the progress of policy in two separate documents, the ‘Nature Accounts’ (‘Natuur-
balans’) and the Environmental Accounts (‘Milieubalans’)3. To assess and evaluate the 
state of nature and the environment, the RIVM uses so called ecological indicators to  
assess theses states of nature and the environment. About once every four years, Nature 
and Environmental Outlooks (‘Natuurverkenning’ and ‘Milieuverkenning’) are pro-
duced. In these reports, different policy scenarios are explored and tested for their future 
effects on the state of nature and the environment. Besides these structural activities, the 
planning bureau is also involved in ad hoc activities, such as ex ante evaluations of  
policy plans or in response to specific policy questions. 
For many of their activities and products, the RIVM relies heavily on knowledge and  
insights from natural science (mainly ecology, earth science and chemistry). For exam-
ple, the ecological indicators presented and the computer models used are based on data 
and knowledge about abiotic characteristics in sites, trends and distributions of species, 
ecological cause and effect relations etc. From a pool of scientific knowledge, the RIVM 
selects data and knowledge and integrates and translates it into usable knowledge for 
policy. The RIVM aims to establish authority by developing products that are both scien-
tifically valid and usable at the same time. However, as scientific validity is often 
claimed to depend on distance from policy while usability is claimed to depend on 
closeness, the RIVM’s job description involves a dilemma, which can be analyzed by 
applying the concept of boundary work. This document analyzes one element of the 
                                                   
2
  On 1 January 2006, the planning bureau tasks at the RIVM were hived off, and the independ-
ent Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (Milieu- en Natuurplanbureau, MNP) 
was established. The MNP was put on the same footing within the government as the other 
three planning bureaus (that is, directly under the Secretary General of the ministry that pro-
vides the main funds). This document describes activities from before 2006; therefore most 
of the interviewees refer to the RIVM. In this document I am connecting to this practice and 
use of language by my interviewees and will refer to the RIVM throughout the text whilst  
being aware that MNP would at the time of writing (but not the time of observation) be a 
more precise term. 
3
  The activities are now done by the MNP. 
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RIVM’s work, the one of ‘calculating election manifestoes’ in 2002, from that perspec-
tive.  
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2. Calculating election manifestoes, risks and 
advantages 
2.1 Introduction 
The Netherlands has a unique tradition in that most political parties – prior to finalizing 
these documents – hand their political election manifestoes to two ‘planning bureaus’ for 
calculation of effects. These ‘planning bureaus’ are the Netherlands’ Bureau for Eco-
nomic Policy Analysis (or in Dutch Centraal Plan Bureau, abbreviation used here: CPB) 
and the National Institute for Public Health and Environment (RIVM). Both bureaus are 
part of the central government bureaucracy and resort directly under a member of the 
management team of their respective ministers4. 
Even though the phenomenon of ‘calculating election manifestoes’ is relatively new, it 
has quickly become part and parcel of the Dutch election process. Even to such an extent 
that most insiders can hardly imagine an election without these calculations. It is com-
mon to refer to the outcomes of the calculations as a ‘stamp of approval’ from the ‘mas-
ters of calculation’ (‘rekenmeesters’), needed to be considered worthy to participate in 
the government (coalition) or in fact, be a credible political party5. However, from the 
perspective of an outsider to Dutch political culture, the phenomenon is odd, as it would 
seem that the ‘calculation of the political’ potentially takes out the politics of an election, 
thereby shifting the boundary between experts and politics. It will be interesting to  
observe whether the participants experience the exercise as such or not. 
The first time such calculation took place was in 1986, with the CPB to be the organiza-
tion to do this. The CPB focuses on macro-economic impacts of election manifestoes, 
which is, also according the CPB itself (Don, 2003: 22-23), a relatively narrow focus. 
Following an offer to the political parties in 1989 by the Environment Minister, the 
RIVM followed suit and started doing calculations in 1994, but then focusing on envi-
ronmental impacts. The work of the RIVM is the focus of the current report, and the  
author wishes to analyze the calculation of election manifestoes by this bureau in the 
election year 2002. 
Why would the political parties embark on an exercise like this one might ask? The peo-
ple I have spoken on the topic stress the advantage of increasing comparability between 
political parties, as they are all assessed using the same method and outcomes are pre-
sented in a uniform way. I have not studied which party decided to have its manifesto 
calculated first, but it is clear that the phenomenon of ‘herding’ is present in the sense 
                                                   
4
  In the case of the CPB this is the Ministry of Economic Affairs, in the case of the RIVM the 
situation was more complex with funding coming from the Ministry of Public Health, the 
Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of Agriculture. For the calculation of election 
manifestoes, the Minister of the Environment was the one Minister formally assigning the 
task of calculating the manifestoes to the RIVM. 
5
  For example, the Socialist Party indicated that, according to internal evaluations, not partici-
pating in the calculation exercise had cost the party one seat in Parliament in 1998 (which is 
quite significant for such a small party). Mr. Irrgang, The Hague, 12 August 2004. 
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that political parties only wish to participate in the calculation process if other parties 
also participate and are afraid of stepping out if others do not step out. 
“With the CPB calculation, 80% of the political relevance is in the fact whether you 
have or have not done the calculation. It is a mechanism of approval. In 1998 we 
asked NYFER [a consultancy presenting itself as an alternative to the CPB, DH] 
whether they were willing to do the calculation for us instead of CPB. They  
refused”6. 
“Groen Links had extensive debates about the usefulness of the calculation process, 
with one wing of the party wanting to stick to the image of a party that is different, 
one wing aiming for credibility and expertise as the image with the voter. Once this 
debate was closed, nobody mentioned this any more.”7 
The practice of calculating election manifestoes by RIVM originates in 1994, even 
though the offer to start doing this was already made in the 1990s. According to one of 
my interviewees, calculating election manifestoes before 1994 may have been impossi-
ble: 
“Minister Nijpels suggested to start doing the calculations, he suggested it the par-
ties for the 1989 elections but it didn’t happen then. One factor influencing the  
debate is the fact that it actually became possible to do this type of analysis after 
‘Zorgen voor Morgen’, which was a broad and encompassing analysis. We really 
developed the tools for this type of analysis after 1989. The work is methodologically 
an outgrowth of the work done for the second National Environmental Policy Plan, 
where we already paid much attention to the effectiveness of possible new meas-
ures.”8  
In 1994, the two most motivated parties did however knock on the RIVM’s door. It 
seems that ‘herding in’ was present at the time, with some parties following Groen Links 
and D66 with much hesitation. 
“Groen Links and D66 were the parties that came by early, especially Groen Links, 
they already came by in 1992. […]The other parties came by later, about a month 
before the elections. Especially with CDA and VVD I felt they felt compelled to join 
but did not really want to do it. The CDA chairperson had many questions about our 
precision.”9 
“The parties initially had reservations about the idea of having their manifestoes 
calculated. The Minister was enthusiastic as was RIVM’s director. One element in 
the decision process was the fact that political parties were afraid to be burned in the 
press by environmental ngo’s for not participating in the calculation process. Groen 
Links was ahead of the other parties, we pleaded with the PvdA to follow suit”10. 
                                                   
6
  Mr. Irrgang, The Hague, 12 August 2004. 
7
  Mrs. Streefkerk, Den Haag, 1 September 2004. 
8
  Mr. Wieringa, RIVM, Bilthoven, 31 August 2004. 
9
  Mr. Wieringa, RIVM, Bilthoven, 31 August 2004. 
10
  Mr. Van den Biggelaar, Utrecht 31 August 2004. Groen Links means ‘Green Left’, or  
perhaps more simply, the Greens. 
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2.2 Calculating election manifestoes: existing knowledge from the CPB 
experience 
There is little academic work on election manifesto calculations by the RIVM. This is 
different in case of the CPB, for which Graafland and Ros published an edited volume in 
2003. Although the perspective of boundary work was not used in this volume, there are 
hints of various boundaries and the way in which they are drawn. 
One example of boundary work – literally – is the determination of the boundary rules: 
who is ‘in’ the exercise of calculating and who is not. It appears that the interaction  
between planning bureau and political party is normally in the hands of a limited number 
of people (Den Butter, 2003: 35). From the planning bureau side, probably by preroga-
tive of the management, ‘issue specialists’ are involved, that is, those people who have 
experience in building and then applying CPB models for a certain policy domain such 
as higher education or the environment. These models tend to be based on neo-classical 
economic assumptions. Involved from the political party’s side are party leaders; these 
also decide which ‘issue specialists’ from Parliament (tax and economic spokesmen) will 
be involved. These MPs then take their assistants, people from party think tanks (‘scien-
tific bureaus of the parties’, sponsored by state subsidies), and sometimes people from 
the party headquarters with them. 
In terms of authority rules: it is reported that the degree to which these people can  
authoritatively speak for their parties in the calculation process is dubious. The CPB 
places this problem squarely in the domain of the political parties themselves because 
“CPB cannot and should not interfere with decision-making procedures of the various 
parties” (ibid.: 25). 
There are other boundaries too, such as the ones between the parties. As a boundary rule, 
it is custom not to communicate the brilliant plans any party might have to other parties. 
But instrumental learning is just a matter of time. The CPB experience demonstrates a 
learning curve in the sense that because of the repeated interaction between political par-
ties and CPB over the following elections, political parties detect the most important 
drivers in the CPB models (in this case, essentially labor costs). Parties can and do take 
this into account, and in the process. There is no information rule prohibiting parties 
from picking up ideas from each other after the calculation has been completed. There-
fore they see which proposals were put forward by other parties, and which ones of those 
worked and which ones did not (at least in the world of CPB models). This is not incon-
sequential. Den Butter (2003: 40) speaks of a “remarkable convergence of policy plans”, 
which makes the whole exercise a potential cause of political lock-ins and is somewhat 
disconcerting from the perspective of political diversity. 
When summarized (Keuzenkamp, 2003: 4) the supposed advantages of the CPB exercise 
have a distinct technocratic ring to them mainly because it seems that the experts are on 
top rather than on tap and because there seems to be an implicit belief in the existence of 
optimal policy choices. It is remarkable how open many of the CPB officials involved 
are about some clearly technocratic aspects. The advantages are considered to be located 
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in the disciplining11 and comparability creating character of the exercise. With pleasure it 
is concluded that parties are kept away from election promises that are unrealistic and 
the parties’ manifestoes are presented in a comparable fashion. 
Obviously, some of the advantages sketched can be regarded as downsides as well. Why 
should certain (economic) indicators such as government deficit and debt be so sacro-
sanct that they are more important than a good system of health care? Why should all 
parties be comparable and why should the parties receive help from non-elected public 
officials in presenting their election manifesto in a rather non-transparent process? And 
if it is a good thing that parties can be compared well, is it also a good thing that their 
ideas become practically the same? These are some of the questions and ideas that I will 
take into the next paragraphs, which are on the RIVM. 
2.3 The specificness of RIVM calculation 
There are several reasons to think why the RIVM’s experience in calculating election 
manifestoes in respect of environmental effects will be somewhat different from the 
CPB’s. For starters, the RIVM started later than the CPB with calculating election mani-
festoes. What’s more: the RIVM calculations are generally deemed to be of less impor-
tance than those of the CPB. This is perhaps related to the fact that they do not concern 
the economy but the environment and is visible in for instance the lower level of media 
attention and the absence of references to the results in election debates. In various ways, 
the RIVM’s calculations are an addition to the CPB’s. For instance, they are made later 
and have to heed the assumptions made by the CPB. The RIVM’s calculations are based 
on a completely different set of models (see Appendix II). They start with emissions, go 
to concentrations and then to impact on the environment. There is an extensive set of  
parameters – outlined in the National Environmental Policy Plans – that is used to judge 
these impacts. This set is considerably more specific and extensive (many sorts of pollu-
tion are covered) than the CPB’s set of parameters, which tends to focus on parameters 
such as unemployment and government deficit. Only some of the CPB parameters 
(mainly government deficit as percentage of gross national product and then only since 
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  The calculation process by the CPB is disciplining in various ways. Firstly, all parties must 
buy into a so-called baseline scenario, which is an image of the near future in economic terms 
and assumes certain definitions for unemployment, budget, and etcetera. Different expecta-
tions or interpretations have to be left behind and raising questions about these matters is  
described as ‘quibbling about background numbers’ (ibid.). An important part of the baseline 
scenario is the so-called budgetary space, the amount of government monies available for  
additional public spending, which is established by a group of high ranking public officials 
from ministries and the central bank on the one hand and the Social Economic Council on the 
other in the year before the elections. Secondly, for the manifestoes to be calculated, they 
have to be translated into concrete measures, which requires an additional level of concrete-
ness. The practice of calculation goes further than that however: the planning bureaus retain 
the right to determine whether certain proposed measures are technologically, institutionally 
and economically feasible. If not, they will not analyze these measures and act as if the 
measures do not exist. Thirdly, and in line with this, if monies are required to take certain 
measures, the source of these monies has to be revealed (no such thing as a free lunch).  
Finally, the two calculations (CPB and RIVM) are linked so as to prevent the occurrence of 
‘inconsistent’ policies. 
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the introduction of the Euro) have target values that are binding for all parties, although 
the parties have a very strong electoral incentive to be fiscally conservative. 
2.4 Starting point for RIVM: enter the world of budgetary space and 
policy shortages 
As part of their effort to analyze the 2002 election manifestoes, CPB and RIVM started 
working on the development of the so-called Medium Long Term (MLT) economic sce-
nario in 2001. This scenario was mainly a product of the CPB and it was the institute’s 
best guess of the development in major economic parameters for the period 2002-2006 
under the assumption of unchanged government policies. The document itself became 
available in November 2001 and was the first indication of tougher economic times for 
the Netherlands in about a decade. An important concept in the MLT scenario is ‘budg-
etary space’. The concept indicates, applying a certain maximum government deficit 
(currently based on European Union treaties) and an assumption about the desired level 
of government debt, how much the next government will be able to spend freely. Given 
the worsened economic situation, the ‘budgetary space’ decreased considerably as com-
pared to the predictions that were made early 2001. This was to the horror of certain par-
ties who had already started preparing the groundwork of their manifestoes. 
In the year 2002, the Netherlands had gone through a period of economic upturn (about 
4% annual growth) in the seven or eight years before. This growth had surpassed CPB’s 
cautious predictions made in 1998 and ‘budgetary space’ ballooned. Because all political 
parties had had their manifestoes calculated by the CPB in 1998, there were relatively 
few concrete ideas for spending the ‘additional money’, although the Conservative Lib-
erals (VVD) had a preference for tax cuts and debt reduction and the Social Democrats a 
preference for government investments in education and health care. The structural  
effect of eight years of surprisingly high economic growth rates, was that several politi-
cal parties were starting to see the CPB as a too conservative agency and pushed for a 
less conservative growth prediction in 2001. The CPB withstood this pressure however 
and did continue to apply conservative growth estimates (1.5% economic growth). The 
RIVM also used these conservative estimates (that later turned out to be way too opti-
mistic anyway). 
Within RIVM, the calculation of election manifestoes fell under the remit of the group 
that was also responsible for the Environmental Outlooks (‘Milieuverkenningen’, see 
e.g. Van Asselt, 2000). The group was supported by experts from other parts of the 
RIVM. The RIVM spends about 1.5 to 2 person years in the calculation process. At the 
time of the preparations for calculating the election programs, the fifth outlook had just 
been published (year 2000), giving the RIVM a good starting point for the calculation.  
The first step was an assessment of changes in government policies since that period. 
This resulted in a long table of four pages with about 120 new measures that were  
decided by Cabinet or were to be decided by Cabinet at the time. This was combined 
with long standing government goals from the National Environmental Policy Plan 
(Fourth version). By the time the CPB had its note on the Budgetary and economic out-
look ready, the RIVM team sent a note (‘Note on policy shortages Nature and Environ-
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ment in 2010’12) to all political parties indicating areas where additional policy measures 
could be taken. The accompanying letter to the political parties indicated that 
“This note is meant as a helping device for the political parties in making choices for 
those nature and environmental problems that they want to address first. In view of 
the fact that the CPB has at the same time submitted a note on the budgetary space 
for the coming Cabinet period (2003-2006), parties can weigh their ambitions in the 
fields of environment and economy against each other”13. 
The ‘policy shortages’ are summarized in a table with some explanatory text. The table 
below is an excerpt of the much larger table in the note on policy shortages. 
Policy shortages environment Target 2010 Prognosis 2010 
Greenhouse emissions (CO-2 equivalents) 220-224 224-228 
SO-2 emissions (ktons) 46 65-72 
Nox emissions (kton) 238 270-290 
Acidification (mol acid equivalents annual average NL)  2150 2500 
Noise disturbance (number of houses above 70 dB(A) 
because of national (rail)roads14) 
0 40.000-50.000 
External safety (number of facilities where individual 
risk of death is higher than 10-6) 
0 625-725 
 
With footnotes in the table, the readers are warned of different assumptions that are 
made (i.e. the lower and the higher growth scenario that is used for assessing future 
greenhouse gas emissions) and uncertainties such as the fact that risks in smaller facili-
ties are unknown (external safety). The explanatory texts in the note differ strongly in 
character. In general, the texts on nature policy are neutral, merely indicating whether 
goals are achieved or not. In the part of environmental topics (problems outlined in the 
table above), the texts are more pressing. The text on acidification calls for extra meas-
ures, the text on noise disturbance is relatively graphic as it describes the health effects 
of too high levels of noise, and under external safety a relatively large piece of text is 
devoted to the risks of those living under the airport, indicating that these risks are  
related to the number of flights rather than an efficient use of airstrips (as the policy is 
assuming). Logical for a note on ‘policy shortages’ is that in none of the texts there is an 
indication that policies are achieving targets even though such policies exist. In that 
sense, the note is one-sided. 
                                                   
12
  ‘Notitie Beleidstekorten Natuur en Milieu in 2010’. Sent to all political parties on 21  
November 2001. 
13
  Ibid. 
14
  Example only. Noise disturbance also includes noise from airports and noise in natural areas. 
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3. Institutionalization: rules of engagement 
3.1 Formal rules: protocol and rules of play 
When one is looking for hints on institutionalization, the first place to look is the place 
where these rules may have been written down. At the most general level, such rules are 
to be found in the protocol that the four Dutch planning offices, including RIVM, have 
drafted with the government (ODP 1996)15. This protocol is particularly concerned with two 
boundaries: the one between relevant and irrelevant knowledge, and secondly the one  
between independence and dependence of the planning bureaus. The document indicates that 
the planning bureaus should produce policy relevant knowledge, but at the same time must 
(bee seen to) operate independently from the government. To guarantee policy relevance the 
protocol contains several procedures wherein policy makers and government officials are  
involved. For example, the directors of the planning offices are expected to report regularly 
to government and the working programs of the planning offices are formally adopted by 
their respective ministers. On this, the protocol indicates that: 
“The planning office function involves performing scientific outlooks, analyses and 
prognoses that are relevant for the strategic policies of the government’16”. 
‘The planning offices are to preserve their reputation as impartial and objective  
organizations that are loyal to the government”17. 
If these were the only statements in the texts, one could perhaps conclude that relevance 
were the only goal laid out. However, the protocol puts equal stress on the independence 
and distance of the planning bureaus from policy makers. The protocol indicates that: 
“The independence of the planning offices regarding the contents of their work is 
guaranteed by regulations, by the independent position of the planning offices within 
the administration and by rules of the game that have developed in practice”18. 
Whereas this statement leaves some room for maneuvering, the next statement is less 
ambiguous: 
“In performing their duties, the planning offices observe distance from daily policy 
practice”19. 
And finally, the importance of scientific validity is emphasized: 
“The information provided by the planning offices meets scientific standards”20. 
To conclude, the protocol emphasizes that the RIVM should be usable and scientifically 
valid but does not acknowledge that a dilemma might be involved in fulfilling both crite-
                                                   
15
  This part based on Huitema and Turnhout, 2005. The autor is grateful to Esther Turnhout for 
allowing use of her material here. 
16
  Source: ODP 1996. 
17
  Ibid. 
18
  Ibid. 
19
  Ibid. 
20
  Ibid. 
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ria at the same time. The protocol does however place the planning bureaus squarely in 
the remit of the bureaucracy, which need to be loyal to the government (authority rule 
stressing hierarchy) and their main goal of producing ‘policy relevant’ information  
(information rule). 
In addition to these relatively generic rules at the planning bureau level, rules were pro-
duced specifically for the interaction between RIVM and the political parties during the 
calculation work. These were laid down in a brief note, the ‘rules of play’ (‘spelregels’) 
that were drafted by the RIVM and subsequently agreed upon by the political parties and 
the RIVM representatives subsequently.21 The complete list of rules reads as follows: 
1. All policies that affect the state of the environment, including infrastructure policies, 
land use planning and agricultural policies), as far as the party in question will intro-
duce it, if in power in the next Cabinet period (until 2006), will be calculated. Effects 
after that period will be calculated on the basis of unchanged policies at the end of 
the Cabinet period; 
2. The current environmental policies (‘standing policies’) form the baseline for com-
parison. If the current government has announced new policies, these will be consid-
ered part of the standing policies, if they are sufficiently concrete; 
3. When relevant, parties indicate which measures are dependent on economic growth 
and how they will deal with economic and ecological negative and positive surprises; 
4. International policies (including the costs) will be taken into account including an  
assessment of their likelihood of realization (and if warranted an uncertainty margin); 
5. The impacts of environmental measures are calculated for the year 2010 (which is 
the year for which most environmental goals have been stated). For certain parts of 
the election manifestoes, the time horizon will be 2020. 
In addition to these rules, which are almost all substance related and not about the inter-
action between RIVM experts and politicians, one boundary rule that is normally in 
place is temporary lifted for the calculation exercise. RIVM staff is formally part of the 
bureaucracy of the national government. This means that their contacts with the outside 
world, including political parties, are regulated by Cabinet guidelines.22 By 2002, these 
guidelines detailed that written or face-to-face contacts between Members of Parliament 
and RIVM officials require ministerial permission on a case-by-case basis.23 Such per-
mission is normally given and reporting intentions to contact officials is perhaps best 
understood as a courtesy to the Minister, so that he/she is aware of the contacts that are 
ongoing. For the matter of calculation election manifestoes, the Minister gives blanket 
                                                   
21
  Source: RIVM working document ‘Verkiezingen en Milieu – spelregels doorrekening  
verkiezingsprogramma’s 2006’, written by mr. Maas, January 26, 2001. 
22
  The regulations in questions are called ‘Aanwijzingen inzake externe contacten van rijksamb-
tenaren’ (1998). The author thanks mr. Petersen and mr. Maas (both RIVM) for pointing this 
out. 
23
  Since 2002, most of the interactions between RIVM and politicians have been concentrated 
in a separate and freestanding organization, called the Environmental Assessment Agency 
(‘Milieu en Natuur Planbureau’). This agency has so-called planning bureau status. The Min-
ister directly passes on requests for information from MP’s to this bureau. The bureau  
informs the minister of the answer and makes their answer public. The author thanks mr.  
Petersen and mr. Maas (both RIVM) for clarifying this. 
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approval for all contacts between RIVM staff and MP’s plus their assistants and high-
ranked party members. 
3.2 Working rules 
The 18 interviews I have held with people involved in the calculation work shed more 
light on the institutionalization of discourses than the rules laid out on paper. The follow-
ing rules are applied: 
Boundary rules: (1) the people ‘in’ the exercise are management representatives of the 
RIVM, experts working at the RIVM, and a small circle of party representatives (either 
topic specialists in parliament, members of the parties’ scientific bureaus, or related aca-
demics). (2) The Minister of the Environment offers the opportunity for calculation to 
those parties that have representation in Parliament. (3) In the determination of the ‘real-
ness’ of proposed measures, legal hurdles (i.e. EU policies) are considered unchangeable 
and thus prohibitive of implementing the measure. Societal resistance on the other hand, 
even if it can be anticipated, is not considered prohibitive of implementing measures. 
Authority rules: (1) it is the parties themselves that determine who they send to the meet-
ings with the RIVM and to communicate the outcomes to the rest of the party. (2) The 
political parties delegate a spokesman that guards the process from their perspective and 
communicates the outcomes of the meetings amongst political parties to CPB and 
RIVM. (3) The RIVM assumes in its calculation that, despite the fact that the Nether-
lands always have coalition governments, the party in question will be the only one in 
government for the next turn. (4) RIVM experts make determinations about the degree to 
which measures are ‘realistic’ and should be taken into account are made by RIVM  
experts. They do allow however for comments by the parties. In case of disagreement, 
other experts are consulted. 
Information rules: (1) the political parties (as far as already in Parliament) meet and dis-
cuss procedure and planning of the calculation exercise amongst each other. (2) The 
RIVM specialists use the manifestoes to determine which measures each party wants to 
take. Their interpretation is sent for comment to the parties to see if the information is 
correct. (3) There is extensive bilateral interaction between RIVM experts and party rep-
resentatives (mostly assistants to MP’s) to get an operationalization of the election mani-
festoes. (4) The RIVM takes care of a level playing field amongst parties. If RIVM  
experts communicate a certain new idea to one party, they are obliged to inform the 
other parties as well. 
What the analysis so far obscures to some extent is that it misses the point that the RIVM 
approach to calculating the election programs is a desire to be consistent with the CPB as 
much as possible. The CPB and RIVM have developed an active cooperation in which 
they agree to use the same information about or conception of the economic scenario that 
will be applied in their calculations, the measures that parties propose in their election 
manifestoes and the amounts associated with it, and the degree to which measures are 
considered as realistic. This is quite remarkable as the calculation of election manifestoes 
for environmental effects arose in a political desire (minister of the Environment, envi-
ronmental NGO’s, several political parties) to have a counter weapon to the CPB analy-
ses of manifestoes that emphasize the economy too much (at least in their opinion).  
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In the opinion of the RIVM and CPB however, their analyses are related. The first rela-
tionship is in the fact that environmental problems are related to economic growth: eco-
nomic growth often implies increased environmental pressure; sometimes it can imply 
less environmental pressure. The second relationship is in the fact that environmental 
policies themselves cost money and are therefore economically salient. Environmental 
policies may cost the government money, but very often the private sector also has to 
draw its purse. Although this explanation for having a close cooperation seems rather 
convincing, it is possible to make a case for not cooperating too closely. This is because, 
as part of the disciplining role of politicians it sees for itself, the CPB opts for a conser-
vative estimate of future growth rates of the economy and therefore conservative esti-
mates of tax receipts. Although it may be economically prudent to estimate low eco-
nomic growth rates, from an environmental perspective it would be more prudent to  
apply a high economic growth rate to see what the worst-case scenario in terms of envi-
ronmental pressure will be. This issue had in fact already been publicly discussed in 
1998 and it then led to various consequences. The first is that in the sphere of climate 
policies, the RIVM and CPB would start to work with a higher growth rate scenario to be 
on the safe side. The second effect was that a ‘sensitivity analysis’ was introduced, 
which implied that the parties would indicate their preferences for government spending 
under different economic scenarios24. The third effect was that in the negotiations about 
the new coalition government, the Social Democrats negotiated with their partners that in 
years of economic growth beyond 3%, government spending on environmental measures 
would automatically increase as a rule. 
3.3 How is it supposed to work? Like a classical bureaucracy… 
I find that the classical bureaucratic discourse works best to encapsulate the way the cal-
culation process is supposed to work. The director of RIVM, Mr. Van Egmond, makes 
some remarks that are also indicative of this vision. When asked about the relation  
between politicians and RIVM staff, he indicated that politicians are on top, and RIVM 
on tap. 
“Politicians are the boss in our model, that’s good. If they want to decide something 
then that is the way it is” 25.  
An important boundary in the bureaucratic discourse is the one between views and facts 
– wherein views are the realm of politics and facts the prerogative of the bureaucracy. 
This boundary is clearly visible in the way mr. Van Egmond talks about the calculation 
work:  
“There is a difference between facts and visions, it may happen that a party says 
they want to achieve the Kyoto protocol but have an empty toolkit. (…) We want to 
contribute to the quality of the debate in Den Haag, we do this by bringing all the 
relevant facts and knowledge to the table. If those facts have come to the table, the 
debate has been good. Compare us to a travel guide” 26. 
                                                   
24
  Based on comments to an earlier draft by mr. Petersen and mr. Maas (both RIVM). 
25
  Mr. Van Egmond, Bilthoven 13 September 2004. 
26
  Ibid. 
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The most dominant vision on the calculation work is one of stepwise translating political 
promises to policy, also a trait of the classical bureaucratic discourse. Says mr. Van  
Egmond: 
“We digitalize policy. If parties select certain goals they can come to us, it is like a 
menu in a restaurant. For example if they want to reduce CO2 emissions and keep 
the nuclear power plant Borssele open, then we tell them how much CO2 emissions 
are being saved. But they have to tell us whether they want the plant open or close 
it.27” 
It is in this vein that the translation of visions to policies is not considered as something 
very problematic for the maintenance of the ideological profile of political parties, at 
least by RIVM staff: 
“The calculation exercise forces parties not to abandon their vision but rather to 
make their views more concrete”28. 
The matter of bureaucratic turf also figures prominently in the minds of the officials,  
especially when it comes to the relation between CPB (economic calculations) and 
RIVM. The officials involved go to great lengths to make sure that the promises that 
politicians make in the area of environmental policy are ‘paid for’ and accounted for in 
the CPB analysis. Discrepancies between the statements of both planning bureaus are 
considered highly disturbing: 
“For us (ministry of the Environment, DH) it is sometimes an advantage that more 
than one planning bureau exists. However if these bureaus make different assump-
tions, e.g. in the case or airport Schiphol, everybody in the country gets confused 
and we get confused. Agreements must be reached.” 29 
Finally, the bureaucratic model does not see a large role in policy making for ordinary 
citizens, except through elections. The fact that RIVM officially engages in the exercise 
of calculating manifestoes on behalf of the voter, fits the bureaucratic model. Given the 
role division between politicians and bureaucracy in this model, giving a direct voting 
advice would be explained as a reversal of roles. Indeed, the information rules make 
clear that the communication of the outcomes by RIVM does not include a voting rec-
ommendation but that the outcomes must be communicated as a list of strengths and 
weaknesses of the various parties. As one of our interviewees put it: 
“The RIVM’s role is to gather the facts (based or not on models or expert judgment) 
and leave the conclusions to the voter” 30. 
In sum, the bureaucratic model holds seems to accurately describe how the calculation of 
election manifestoes is supposed to work. RIVM staff there does consist of knowledge 
workers that are hired at the service of political power. At least rule-wise, the institute 
places itself outside the realm of the issue of values. Because of their status as public  
                                                   
27
  Ibid. 
28
  Mr. Honig, Bilthoven, 8 September 2004. 
29
  Mr. Van der Vlist, The Hague, 11 August 2004 
30
  This from one of the evaluation forms by the participants in the calculation exercise. For  
reasons of privacy, the person that made this remark cannot be revealed. 
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officials, RIVM staff enjoys privileges in terms of information that the ordinary public 
does not have (e.g. on Cabinet decisions). 
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4. Structuration: does practice follow the rules? 
4.1 Herding out  
The Dutch elections of 2002 were special because of various reasons. The most impor-
tant reason was the large degree of political instability due to popular dissatisfaction with 
government policies. Especially one populist party, the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF), was 
able to mobilize support from dissatisfied voters, but its leader was killed by the hands of 
a militant animal rights activist shortly before the elections. After this first political mur-
der in decades31, his party gained 25 seats in the (150 seat) Second Chamber of Parlia-
ment. The large gain in the number of seats came at the expense of the Social Democrats 
(PvdA) and the Conservative Liberal Party (VVD). Both parties were members of the 
government coalition that had ruled since 1994. 
 
One element that makes the rise of the LPF interesting from the boundary work perspec-
tive is the party’s rejection of technocratic, inner circle and backroom politics and its will 
to replace it with ‘common sense’ solutions. The party was able to portray the sitting 
government as representatives of ‘old politics’. It would lead too far to describe all ele-
ments of ‘old politics’ as the LPF portrayed them to be, but for certain the calculation of 
                                                   
31
  The last political murders in the Netherlands before this one took place in the Second World 
War, although depending on one’s perspective one could also count the (or some) deaths dur-
ing Indonesia’s independence war as such. The last political murder in peacetime was centu-
ries before that. 
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election manifestoes and the large importance of the CPB in economic policy making 
was one of the elements according to the LPF. Their leader broke away from the existing 
consensus amongst political parties that the CPB should be consulted on economic poli-
cies in election manifestoes, talked for a while with a private consultancy firm that pre-
sented as an alternative to the CPB, but in the end simply refused to have this done. This 
refusal also pertained to the RIVM calculation32,33. 
Even though not seated in Parliament, Pim Fortuyn’s party played a crucial role is the 
process that would ensue. One of the contentions of Pim Fortuyn was that environmental 
problems had been solved. His party lent its ear to those scientists that contend that cli-
mate change is not occurring. Although it may seem a rather extreme stance, other par-
ties were not considering environmental issues top of their priority list either, if we may 
believe the media34. Indications for that were the low places of environmental experts on 
the parties’ election list. Media interest in environmental issues was low in general. 
As had become normal in the case of calculating the election programs, the Minister of 
the Environment had offered those parties in Parliament that they could have their mani-
festoes calculated early 2001. The RIVM was assuming that it would ‘calculate’ eight 
election manifestoes: Christian Democrats (CDA), Social Democrats (PvdA), Conserva-
tive Liberals (VVD), Progressive Liberals (D66), Green Left (Groen Links, GL), Social-
ist Party (SP), Christian Union (Christen Unie, CU) and Dutch Reformed Party (Staat-
kundig Gereformeerde Partij, SGP). Most susceptible a critical approach of the existence 
of environmental problems were the Conservative Liberals (VVD), who spoke out 
against portraying doom images in connection with environmental issues but concurred 
that climate change was a major problem. 
The refusal by the LPF to have its election manifesto calculated by the CPB and its  
attack of the concept of calculating election manifestoes in general created a certain level 
of freedom for other parties. Specifically the VVD now took the decision not to have 
their election manifesto calculated by the RIVM. In a phone call to the project leader at 
RIVM, the VVD MP who focused on environmental issues indicated that: 
“[…] calculation requires such a level of concretization of the party’s intentions, that 
the party is not willing to offer it because this is besides the point of an election 
manifesto and is way too technocratic. The VVD does not recognize itself at all in the 
set of measures that were calculated in 1998”35. 
                                                   
32
  Even if the party had wanted to have calculations done, this would have virtually been  
impossible. The calculation exercise takes about five to six months and basically takes place 
in the full year before the elections. The LPF formed only a few months before the elections, 
at the latest possible dates under the election law. 
33
  After the elections the LPF came to power through a coalition with the Christian Democrats 
(CDA) and the Conservative Liberal Party (VVD). The LPF quickly started suffering from 
infighting and a lack of leadership and the new coalition government of CDA, VVD and LPF 
fell only nine months after it was formed. New elections were necessary. 
34
  ‘Het Milieu? Geen probleem!’, by Maaike van Houten, in: Trouw, 20 November 2001 and 
‘Gevoel van urgentie ontbreekt’, by M. Zuithof, in: Milieudefensie, 2002-1, pp. 13-15. 
35
  Report of the phone conversation in RIVM meeting report of 21 November 2001. 
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In a more recent interview with me, the (then former) MP added that the VVD had 
clearly experienced the calculation work on its manifesto as a trespassing of the bureau-
cratic model and he called the RIVM approach technocratic36. 
“In 1998, the calculation contained many things that are not in our manifesto. The 
calculation is based on an explanation of the manifesto by a few members of the 
party, and this has nothing to do with the manifesto nor with the members of the 
party. Something is either in the manifesto or not, one cannot add things to it. I have 
a philosophical objection to this. […] 
I am not asking things to RIVM, I am also not asking them for policy discretion. The 
proper relations are the other way around. RIVM is making an interpretation of 
election manifestoes that I find methodologically unacceptable […]  
You are giving the power to technocrats; it is MY task to operationalize the election 
manifesto after the elections. If the manifestoes are too vague in the opinion of 
RIVM, they should have reported that.”37 
The CPB had offered – in addition to its standard calculations- to calculate the effects of 
the parties in the sphere of education and health care, but the VVD rejected those as 
well. The party went public with its decision through interviews with national press. The 
party’s decision was explained by pointing at the ‘qualitative nature’ of RIVM’s calcula-
tions and the CPB calculation for education and health care and as compared to the 
CPB’s ‘macro-economic calculation’, which were said to be necessary by the part to 
show ‘the coherence and effects of policy plans’38. The qualitative calculations were said 
to be ‘too political’. The party indicated that its decision had nothing to do with a fear for 
negative outcomes but with the technocratic nature of the exercise. 
“The CPB and the RIVM create a reality on paper. The investments are political 
choices, these are not the remit of the CPB” […] ‘This is the world turned upside 
down. Politics checks the government. Now the government institution CPB threat-
ens to check politics. That was never meant to be”39. 
The phenomenon of herding that was present in the case of CPB and initially the RIVM 
calculations, was now also present but then in reverse. Because the VVD went out, the 
Christian Democrats (CDA) also withdrew. Their argument for this decision (as commu-
nicated to the RIVM) was that the parties had reached an agreement that either all or 
none would participate in the calculation exercise. As the VVD had withdrawn, CDA 
now also felt it should withdraw. There was no other motivation than this one. The  
remaining parties interpreted this as a sign of weakness: 
“The reason why the three parties did not have their manifesto calculated is the 
weakness of their environmental paragraph”.40 
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  Mr. Klein Molenkamp, Rhoon, 8 September 2004. 
37
  Mr. Klein Molenkamp, Rhoon, 8 September 2004. 
38
  VVD blokkeert CPB-visie op onderdelen van programma, in Volkskrant, undated article 
found in RIVM archive. 
39
  ‘Halt aan doorrekenen VVD program, in NRC Handelsblad, 21 November 2001. 
40
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The remaining parties stayed in, except the Christian fundamentalist SGP, which indi-
cated to both RIVM and CPB that the party did not have sufficient manpower to work 
along with the two bureaus. Having lost almost the entire right wing spectrum of politi-
cal parties, the RIVM faced a dilemma on what to do with the request of the remaining 
(left wing) political parties to have their manifesto calculated. There was a sense that the 
added value of the calculation process would be significantly lower but also a feeling 
that the request of the other parties should not be ignored. It is interesting that no consul-
tation on the situation took place between the RIVM and CPB management on what to 
do with the situation. There was an agreement in place that parties could not have their 
manifesto calculated by one planning bureau and then not by another (window shop-
ping)41, but this rule was not invoked. The parties that had already requested the calcula-
tion were taken by surprise by the move of the VVD and CDA and might have reconsid-
ered their request had there been more time42. Instead, the process went ahead as normal. 
4.2 Boundary objects 
4.2.1 Introduction 
In this paragraph I want to look into various aspects of the calculation work that could be 
seen as ‘boundary objects’ in the sense that these objects are the outcome of the bound-
ary work that is done. I start my treatment by discussing how boundaries are drawn  
between ‘real’ measures (the ones that RIVM can and will calculate) and other -  
‘unreal’- measures. As this boundary is too hard, especially from the perspective of the 
side of politics, an intermediate category was created, the textbox measure. There is  
another relevant boundary, which is the one between what can be calculated quantita-
tively and what not. Under the heading of ‘qualitative assessment’ I show how this dif-
ference is perceived by the parties involved. The third boundary object to be discussed 
are the models that RIVM uses: I shall discuss the extent to which these models are  
defined as ‘expert zone only’ or whether there is active discussion of these models  
between experts and politicians. Finally, I present how the boundary between those in 
the exercise and those outside is crossed. This boundary crossing is supposed to occur 
through a report with the outcomes. I will show that this report is considered relatively 
unimportant amongst the participants in the exercise, demonstrating the relatively closed 
nature of the whole process. 
The first step in the exercise is the translation of election manifestoes in measures that 
can be calculated. There tends to be a gap between election manifestoes and measures 
that can be calculated in the models applied at the RIVM. The implication is that an  
effort must be made to ‘operationalize’ the manifestoes. The authority and boundary 
rules in this part of the exercise are such that this is the prerogative of RIVM officials. 
From the side of the RIVM, the first step in this is a broad analysis of the election mani-
festoes, characterizing them in terms of philosophy, analysis of environmental issues and 
approach towards solving them. 
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Especially the larger parties have an apparatus (scientific bureau, friendly professors, 
other networks) that they organize to advise them on certain issues, usually through the 
publication of reports43. The relationship between these reports, which are often pre-
sented to RIVM officials alongside the election manifestoes- and the election manifesto 
itself is somewhat unclear. Ideally, such reports travel through the party organization and 
end up in the manifesto by explicit decision of the party congress. This does however not 
always happen, as the timing of these reports may be off, they are not always intended to 
be used for the manifesto, etc. etc. Generally speaking, the RIVM is willing to analyze 
such documents and use them in the operationalization exercise, but the bureau is hesi-
tant as this takes much time. One can imagine indeed that doing this would be haphazard 
from the perspective of party democracy. 
What happens instead is that, after general description of – what are then often still draft 
versions of– the election manifesto, the RIVM starts making lists of measures that it 
finds in the manifestoes. This results in a relatively long list with (tens) of concrete 
measures that the parties want to undertake in the next period and beyond. The ‘rules of 
play’ of the process are used by the RIVM to distinguish between measures that have to 
be calculated and measures that will not be calculated. This is to an extent a negotiation 
process, where judgments of the measures by party representatives and RIVM-experts 
may differ somewhat and arguments are exchanged. There are many bilateral contacts 
(e-mail, telephone) between party representatives and RIVM-workers on interpretation 
of measures. 
4.2.2 Measures, real or unreal, normal or textbox? 
One boundary that needs to be defined in the negotiation process is the one between real 
and unreal measures. There are various ingredients for this discussion, the question 
whether a causal relation can be established between the measure and effects on the floor 
and the question whether all questions that the RIVM models need answer for have actu-
ally been answered. One interviewee explained that it is not always possible to establish 
a causal relationship between what politicians propose and what will happen in the envi-
ronment, even if it is obvious that there may indeed be such effects: 
“There are some measures that do not cost money. One example is D66, which said 
they wanted to introduce integrated water legislation. There is nothing you can say 
about this beforehand, we are not concerned with administrative efficiency, but we 
care about the real effects in the living environment.”44 
On the matter of causality one of my interviewees explained a difference between  
experts and politicians related to the values of symbols: 
“Some items or statements have political meaning, but RIVM interprets such state-
ments as meaning nothing. It is sometimes of political relevance to say something in 
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a certain way, but not according to the RIVM. The issue at stake is the one of sym-
bols, or imagery. Take the issue of deposit money on bottles. It may have little envi-
ronmental impact, but for the mentality of the population it may be very important. 
There is a difference between the political work and the RIVM.”45 
In my opinion, a very strong driving force in this boundary work is the very practical 
matter of the RIVM models needing input before they can be run, and the same type of 
input from every party. Measures are only real when there are RIVM models that can 
predict their effects, and visions for the future do not necessarily qualify as such: 
“There is a tendency to quantify things, this has its limitations, certainly given the 
progression that environmental policy is making. The real question becomes more 
and more: where do we want to go with the Netherlands. Groen Links for instance 
was particularly interested in new forms of environmental policy for agriculture, 
they came early and posed a plan: what if we develop the sector in this way? I can 
only say: it sounds good, but I can’t quantify it  … You can imagine a world wherein 
agriculture is liberalized worldwide and environmental issues are guaranteed, but 
this can also happen with more market protection.”46 
The reason why the VVD was so upset with the RIVM seems to stem from this aspect: 
“The RIVM does push its agenda on to the parties. They have a certain number of  
issues they deem suitable for calculation and the parties must answer questions 
about them, we are just rubberstamping work by the RIVM and they are systemati-
cally pressing their opinions on to us. If this implies adding to the manifesto, this 
means that RIVM is expanding its assignment”47. 
As the reader might recall, the VVD did decide to participate in the CPB calculation. The 
question may be raised whether the RIVM and CPB calculations differ a great deal in 
this respect. The interviewees of the VVD assert that this is indeed the case; they indi-
cate that all the data needed for the CPB calculation are already in their manifesto, 
whereas this percentage is much lower in case of the RIVM48.  
In addition to the model limitations, the ‘rules of play’ also imply boundaries for what is 
a real measure and what not. The rules of play forbid the calculation of measures that are 
introduced after the next Cabinet period and measures that are not in the remit of the  
national government. This is sometimes disappointing for the parties, especially when 
they propose that measures must be taken at the local, regional or European levels to  
address a certain issue, which can be very logical. To alleviate the pressure somewhat, 
the concept of ‘textbox measure’ was introduced by the RIVM. The textbox measure is a 
measure that has not been calculated as such, but is still reported upon in a separate text-
box to make the (future) plans of a certain party clear to the reader. 
“As is known, measures that have to be taken at the international level (EU) or 
rather at the local level are outside the realm of measures that are taken into account 
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in the calculation. But these measures do get attention in our report, in a separate 
text box (so called text box measure). In that text box, a description will be given 
what might be the effect of said measure, the potential, eventually complemented 
with a number of remarks that add nuance to the discussion or indicate conditions 
that have to be met”49. 
The ‘text box measure’ is one indication of the RIVM responding to critique from the 
political parties. Especially after the 1998 calculation, several parties indicated that they 
felt there was not enough attention for their vision of environmental problems. In 2002, 
the RIVM stressed on many occasions that this time there would be place for visions in 
the calculation effort through the textboxes. 
Another factor in the ‘realness’ of measures in reality is the degree to which measures 
will encounter societal resistance. The ‘rules of play’ indicate that this factor will be  
ignored in the calculation process. It is clear that the various parties involved dealt dif-
ferently with this rule. Most people I spoke to from the political side had one or two 
things to say about plans by other parties that had been ‘approved’ by the RIVM, 
whereas they themselves had not proposed such measures because they deemed them  
unfeasible. One example is the matter of underground CO-2 storage, which D66 used to 
get a good score for climate policy, whereas the PvdA considered such storage societally 
unfeasible because of public resistance. Because of this, some of the parties such as the 
PvdA spoke out in favor of including societal resistance in the calculation process. How-
ever, the Greens were greatly opposed to any changes in that direction and acted as one 
of the enforcers of this boundary and information rule: 
“We did have discussion with the RIVM about the meaning of the concept feasibility: 
RIVM started to look at societal acceptance of measures at some point and then we 
had to tell them it was not their duty to look at that aspect. Their role is to assess 
technical and institutional feasibility, not social acceptance. If we hear that certain 
measures are not possible because of EU regulations, we take this into account and 
talk about it to government”.50 
It does seem however that ignoring societal resistance comes at a certain cost. It does 
stimulate parties to some degree to view themselves as being in the cockpit and assum-
ing they are the ones in control. This experience is somewhat alienating from reality, and 
fits a pattern of Dutch politics relying on planning bureau data for making decisions. 
This pattern comes under attack every so often, but it does not seem that experts nor 
politicians want to part with it. One example of a measure that is dubious in my opinion 
but that was calculated and thus considered real by the RIVM was the so-called ‘open 
space levy’. Purpose of this levy, that was to be added-on to the land use planning sys-
tem, is that in cases where open areas that are to be changed into built-up areas, a levy 
should have to be paid for using this scarce resource. In the process of calculating the 
funds that would be generated by charging this levy, RIVM officials and party represen-
tatives debated even issues such as pipeline projects (building projects where land use 
permission was already granted) and from there on started calculating its effectiveness 
and also possible proceedings. I would personally have doubts about the legal and socie-
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tal feasibility of such a levy. The last time a proposal was made for such a levy, the gov-
ernment lost its parliamentary majority over it (see Huitema, 2002). 
4.2.3 Models 
As the models that RIVM uses are the workhorses in the calculation exercise, I found it 
interesting to find out whether or not the representatives take an interest in the actual 
content of these models and the thinking behind them. The interviewees agree on the fact 
that this is not the case. Says one RIVM expert indicates that the review of the models is 
something that is normally experts’ terrain only: 
“We use a chain of models, revolving around the lowering of use of fossil fuels. What 
is important in the models is the assumptions on price elasticity. Politicians do not 
question such assumptions. Our models are put for societal review and that is where 
we get our comments to the models. We also discuss the models between the expert 
institutes, CPB, ECN and us. Parties could ask an employee to devote time to study 
the models, but they normally don’t. They do respond however when the outcomes 
are different from what they expected.”51 
The people involved from the political side agree. They point out that the need for them 
to know the models is limited. First, because, if the models are incorrect, they will be  
incorrect for all parties alike. Second, because the RIVM calculation is considered less 
important than the CPB calculations: 
“The models that RIVM uses are a black box to us”52.  
“We do not have the time to get to know the models that the RIVM applies. However, 
you know that the models are used to calculate the scores for all parties”.53  
“We do not get insights in the models that RIVM applies. This is not possible because 
of the time pressure we are under. What is reassuring is that if there are errors, these 
will be similar for all parties”.54 
“Because it was the first time we participated in the calculation by RIVM, we were 
not very aware of the models they applied and had little idea on how to influence or 
steer the outcomes in a certain direction. We are less motivated to find out about 
these models than we are with the CPB. […] We have not yet found the trick to  
devise an effective environmental policy, at least predicted by the RIVM. We knew 
too little about environmental issues to be able to have criticism of RIVM’s models, 
which we do have with the CPB. The CPB model is more important for us, because if 
we do not participate in the CPB calculations, we are politically disqualified. The 
RIVM calculation is less important to us, also because as SP we are slightly suspect 
in they eye of the voter in terms of financial discipline. Whether we do well or not in 
the RIVM calculation is less of an issue in the party”55. 
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So the models are considered to be the prerogative of experts by the politicians, and for 
various reasons. It does not seem that the experts involved have to do much boundary 
work, in terms of demarcating ‘their’ territory to keep this situation as it is. One possible 
exception of boundary work, but then to demarcate the boundaries between various bod-
ies of expertise, was found however. This example pertains to the issue of noise distur-
bance, and here RIVM models predicted different outcomes than the models of another 
expert branch of the government. The Note on policy shortages led to an internal discus-
sion within RIVM about the numbers of houses under stress from noise that had been 
published. Of 40-50,000 houses reported to suffer from noise above 70 dB(A), RIVM 
had reported 10,000 to be caused by national roads (highways). This number contrasted 
greatly with the number reported by a part of the Ministry of Traffic and Water Man-
agement, Advisory Service Traffic and Transport (in Dutch AVV), which was 2,60056. A 
comparison resulted in the conclusion that the RIVM and AVV models differed in their 
assumptions on the speed of traffic and the number of houses affected by noise levels at 
certain measuring points (100 meter grids versus postal code areas). The experts working 
on this topic considered these widely different numbers unwanted and already before the 
election calculation work they had been consulting with their colleagues at the Ministry 
about the issue to coordinate numbers. It was decided not to repeat the RIVM numbers 
that had been presented in the policy shortages note. The fact that there were different 
predictions was not communicated to the politicians involved in the calculation process. 
Another interesting aspect, model wise, is the problem that the RIVM ran into various 
situations wherein there are no quantitative models to predict policy effects. Especially 
in the fields of water management, nature and landscape policy, policy proposals cannot 
be judged quantitatively. Instead, qualitative analysis is made by a set of experts. For 
most people involved in the calculation work this is quite a fundamental difference, with 
practically everyone, experts and politicians alike, tending to have greater trust in the 
outcomes of quantitative analyses (with real models) than in qualitative analysis (based 
on expert theories). 
What worried some of the RIVM staff involved about the qualitative judgment was  
imprecision, a risk of arbitrary judgments and a risk of dissatisfaction amongst the politi-
cal parties about the judgments. It was felt that a higher degree of procedural safety 
measures should be incorporated. First measure was the involvement of outside experts 
from other ministries, to guarantee the validity of judgments made by RIVM experts. 
The second measure was the development of a standard approach to scoring measures, 
which was to be approved by high-ranking officials within RIVM before being applied57. 
By February 2002, the officials at RIVM started undertaking efforts to ‘streamline’ the 
judgment process by developing a scale (--/++) and indicating how scores could be 
earned on this scale. 
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The method was described as follows in a draft note58: 
1. Standing policies, or rather the goals expressed in them, are the benchmark; 
2. A + is given if there is ‘substantial reason’ to think that nature quality (etc.) will be 
better off than with existing policies; 
3. A = is given when proposals do not add or change the current policies much; 
4. A – is given when current policies are weakened. 
The officials struggled somewhat with the distinction between intentions and actions. On 
the one hand the note indicates that ‘nice intentions without impact at physical indica-
tors’ do not result in points. On the other hand the note indicates that the targets that a 
political party expresses (intention) is a reason for scoring – or +. There are three other 
‘criteria’ that determine the score: 
1. Do the parties name measures with direct (physical) consequences for the environ-
ment etc. or not? Examples given include: acquisition of agricultural land for nature 
creation, adding protective shields against noise, and broadening rivers; 
2. Do the parties name the instruments that help the realization of measures; do they 
mention policy instruments? 
3. Do the parties reserve extra monies for the realization of the instruments and meas-
ures? 
It is interesting to note that the experts are furthermore warned to judge the ‘total of the 
intentions, not individual measures’ and ‘No money is no effect!’. For each indicator 
(policy goal) the experts were to indicate what the sum of proposals that the political 
made would imply for goal realization. This was to be motivated by indicating which 
group of measures affected the score in a positive sense, which measures affected the 
score in a positive sense.  
The scores and their meanings were proposed to be as follows:59 
1. = or 0, comparable to standing policies; 
2. - less attention than in standing policies (no priority); 
3. +, more money and/or measures and instruments than in standing policies (goals of 
policy unchanged but more instruments); 
4. ++, remarkably more money and/or measures or regulation than standing policies 
(priority, the party is going further than the goals in the basic scenario); 
5. ?, too unclear to judge. 
The writer of the scoring system warned the experts that ‘the final judgment is not a 
simple average of the scores for each criterion’ and that  
“the difference between a ‘+’ and a ‘++’ is of course a bit arbitrary. I propose that 
the leading persons in N&Ls, W, and LO [Laboratories at the RIVM, DH], when the 
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judgments for these subjects are ready, coordinate their minuses and plusses with 
each other”60. 
The experts indeed continued to exchange their views on this scoring system. One out-
come of that decision was that the ‘?’ score disappeared because it was considered too 
vague61. 
Most participants from the side of the political parties felt that the qualitative analyses 
were less valuable than the outcomes of the quantitative calculations. One element of 
this is the accessibility of scores, which is obviously lower with qualitative analyses. 
Several of my interviewees indicated that tables with figures are easier to use for quick 
referencing and that most attention of the reader in their circles would go towards those 
elements: 
“We did have the feeling that the expert judgments that were made in the calculation 
process were arbitrary now and then. The plusses and minuses stated there are de-
termined by a few experts. They are not the bread and butter of the report, most at-
tention is focused on the calculations and figures.”62 
4.2.4 The outcomes 
There are two important chains of communication after the calculations have been com-
pleted. The first one is from those involved to those in the outside world, the second one 
from participants to the political parties themselves. As a (communication) rule, the gen-
eral public is informed of the outcomes through a website, through a press release, and a 
summary of the outcomes. Finally, the outcomes are published in a report. This report 
was printed 1.500 times and sent to a large number of potentially interested parties. The 
report was (and is) freely available from the Internet and it was searched around 2,000 
times at the time. Press releases were sent out to the press agencies and a press confer-
ence was given together with CPB. Most newspapers reported on the calculation exercise 
but focused on the CPB’s analysis in their reports on the calculation projects and the 
RIVM staff felt that ‘their’ outcomes were lost in the subsequent media attention. 
The 160-page report that gives the outcomes of the calculation are rather difficult to 
summarize here is a few words. The summary of the report itself is 13 pages long, but 
most essential is a table indicating the degree to which the election manifestoes of the 
parties involved would imply an improvement or worsening in comparison with standing 
policies. I am reproducing a part of this table, including the issues of the ‘policy short-
ages note’ that were described previously. I have however also added a number of issues 
that were scored qualitatively. I do not claim to give a representative sample of the 
summarizing table in the RIVM document, but picked out - in relatively random fashion 
- some of the issues. The figures in the cells should be read as improvements as com-
pared to standing policies, unless there is a minus sign in front of the number (which is 
nowhere the case). 
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Party intentions PvdA D66 GroenLinks ChristenUnie SP 
CO-2 emission  
reduction (billion 
kilograms) 
8.3 12.0 18.8 8.0 12.7 
SO-2 emission  
reduction (ktons) 
4 - 24 - 14 
Nox emission  
reductions (ktons) 
5 5 24 3 13 
Increase of surface 
in sustainably  
protected nature  
(hectares)  
3,200 115,000 23,500 2,000 3,400 
Noise disturbance 
(Highroads and 
railway traffic) 
++ = ++ + = 
External safety  
(not specified) 
+ = + = = 
Natural areas + + ++ + + 
Safety from floods ++ ++ + + = 
Income from env. 
levies (billion  
EUROs) 
3.9 1.9 15.6 3.4 3.1 
Govt. expenditure 
on env. policies 
(billion EUROs) 
2.0 1.5 0.3 1.1 1.6 
 
The parties are given here in the same order as in the RIVM report and that report  
ordered the parties according to size (PvdA the largest party in Parliament, SP the small-
est). There is no recommendation in terms of which party to vote for if one cares about 
environmental issues, but it is clear that the Green Left party has excellent scores on  
almost all aspects and outscores the other parties. 
In comparison with the ‘policy shortages note’ several changes have occurred. Some of 
these relate to relatively unimportant issues such as the choice of units (i.e. CO-2 equiva-
lents is replaced with kilo’s). Another change is that noise disturbance and external 
safety are no longer expressed quantitatively but qualitatively. Possibly this is related to 
the discussion about the validity of the numbers given in the policy shortages note. 
The table was the main tool for communicating the outcomes of the calculation exercise. 
The text that is added mainly describes the measures that the parties want to take and 
how these differ from standing government policies. Now and then, there is also some 
reference to the likelihood that either standing policies or the measures proposed by the 
different parties achieve the goals set by government documents (mainly National Envi-
ronmental Policy Plan). Here and there, graphs and tables are added that help the reader 
to more quickly get an overview of the outcomes. 
When I asked my interviewees from the political parties about their response to the out-
comes, most of them mentioned two topics. Some had minor difficulties with the sum-
mary. Several of my interviewees spoke of a tendency on the side of the RIVM to give 
summaries that are not in line with the underlying report. Practically every party has 
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something to say about the way their manifesto was described by the RIVM, but most of 
the issues mentioned are relatively minor. The information rule that places watersheds 
between the various parties obviously functioned well. The publication of the report was 
the first opportunity for all party representatives to compare their scores to those of other 
parties and here too, most interviewees made remarks about the RIVM’s decision to  
‘approve’ of certain measures or not, and about the judgment of measure effectiveness 
that RIVM had made. 
Given the fact that the calculation is formally done to help the voter determine what is 
the best party fitting his or her own ideas about environmental issues, it is somewhat 
surprising how low the expectations are in terms of voters understanding environmental 
issues and of voters caring about the outcomes of the calculation exercise. RIVM staff 
see their role as the assistant of the helpless voter: 
“The calculation gives citizens insight in the differences between the parties; it gives 
the parties a platform for creating a certain image. The citizen cannot himself com-
pare the parties with each other”.63 
However, neither as members of a political party does it appear likely that they will hear 
of the content of the discussions between their party leaders and the RIVM, as that prob-
lem is squarely placed in the lap of those party leaders. It is remarkable to note that liter-
ally none of the interviewees thinks that voters are aware or even interested in the out-
comes of the exercise, although some say this is very much the same for the manifestoes 
themselves. 
The second aspect of the communication of the outcomes involves the way the party 
members involved in the exercise communicate with the rest of their party. As is the case 
with the CPB calculations, the RIVM simply assumes that the concretization of meas-
ures, which is really a certain interpretation of the election manifesto, must be communi-
cated to the rest of the party (i.e. party conference, party institutions) by the party repre-
sentatives themselves. It does however not seem that many of the parties involved take 
the effort to do this, implying that there is a potentially problematic issue at stake here, 
not just within the parties, but also in connection with their communication with the pub-
lic. One representative of the Socialist Party that I spoke too was acutely aware of the  
issue, but also indicated he felt the problem should not be overestimated. This is because 
in his opinion, the party line on many issues is continuously shaped and reshaped in sev-
eral settings, including media reports, interviews, etc., etc. He did however indicate that 
there is a boundary that may not be crossed: as a result of the calculation and related 
work, he felt the manifesto (or parts thereof) should not be reversed64. This is the bound-
ary that most parties wish to maintain. Does the RIVM succeed in guarding it? 
In this matter, one must make a distinction between the actual manifesto, which is a rela-
tively brief document and perhaps best seen as the tip of the iceberg, and the party com-
mitments that underlie such a manifesto. There are two possible avenues of RIVM influ-
ence, which is either directly in the manifesto, or through a more subtle process of the 
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generation of commitments to policy measures and goals. I have found examples of both, 
although the first avenue is rare. 
To start with the direct influence of the RIVM on the manifestoes, all parties stress how 
their manifestoes are a party product, and a party product alone. Several of my inter-
viewees indicated that they had completed their manifestoes by the time they submitted 
them to the RIVM. Hence no influence was possible anymore. 
“The calculation is not allowed to be at odds with our manifesto. […] We see the 
calculation not such much as a changing of our manifesto, we see it as a sharpening 
of the manifesto.”65 
Other parties however, submitted draft manifestoes to RIVM, and in at least one case, 
ideas for changes to the draft manifesto gathered from the RIVM were amongst the 
amendments sent to the party congress by the party bureau. The case involved concerns 
the party’s desire for a prohibition of the import of ‘dirty power’ to the Netherlands. 
What was intended is a prohibition of power imports from France, where nuclear power 
plants are used to generate electricity. As there almost was political consensus in the 
Netherlands at the time that the country’s own nuclear power facilities should (eventu-
ally) be abolished, it does make sense to start questioning the pedigree of power imports 
as well. RIVM officials indicated however that a prohibition of dirty power imports was 
legally impossible under European Union law; this was not a measure that could be cal-
culated. Instead, they proposed to replace the prohibition with an import levy on dirty 
power so as to decrease its use. This was then calculated as part of the party’s package 
and the manifesto was subsequently altered. 
It is interesting to notice how one of my interviewees saw possible alterations of the 
manifesto as something that the RIVM, not the party itself should be cautious of: 
“RIVM should give a signal when this threatens to happen”. 66 
The lower part of the iceberg is obviously the biggest chunk. Under the tip of the iceberg 
is a big layer of statements by party leaders, be it in parliament or not. The status of such 
statement is not always that clear, as parties tend to have different wings trying to pull 
the party in a certain direction. When I asked about the influence of the RIVM on their 
ideas, In addition, some saw an ‘unbreakable connection’ between their vision and the 
measures that RIVM calculates: 
“There is no risk of your vision moving to the background, what happens in the cal-
culation exercise is that you get a look in the mirror as to what your vision means in 
a concrete case, your choices are in an unbreakable connection with your vision.”’67 
Most of my interviewees stressed the fact that the RIVM is only one of various parties 
they consult with, alongside a range of ngo’s, party members with professional expertise, 
etc. Although this sounds convincing at first, I did however notice that such consulta-
tions are for various, but not all parties, placed in different organizational locations than 
the manifesto calculation. Consultations with ngo’s etc. are the prerogative of the party 
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commission responsible for drafting the manifesto, the manifesto calculation is much 
more a matter for sitting MP’s. This too appears to be one reason of concern for the 
VVD. The former VVD spokesman I spoke on this matter said: 
“In 1998, the calculation contained many things that are not in our manifesto. The 
calculation is based on an explanation of the manifesto by a few members of the 
party, and this nothing to do with the manifesto nor with the members of the party. 
Something is either in the manifesto or not, one cannot add things to it. I have a phi-
losophical objection to this. […]The people involved in the calculation have not been 
mandated to do this by their party, there is a real threat of hobbyism.”68 
Two other examples illustrate areas where the influence of the RIVM on political parties 
may have indeed become rather large and potentially debatable. One is a levy on car 
ownership and/or car driving, where the RIVM under the motto of creating an equal 
playing field, advised all parties to introduce such a levy in a specific form, which  
implied that the first so many thousand kilometers would be free of charge. This is  
debatable practice because it reduces the differences between political parties. The sec-
ond example relates to the desire of one political party to stimulate energy saving by  
investing 50 million EUROs. Here the RIVM experts indicated that money was not the 
problem but other issues. In reply, this party indicated that it would like to have the 
RIVM’s advice on other cost-effective environmental measures and the RIVM obliged. 
Some of the RIVM staff I interviewed see a risk here, but they indicated that the parties 
are mature enough to determine whether or not certain ideas the RIVM presents to them 
are worth following or not. One of them presented an example where most parties did 
not follow RIVM advice: 
“[…] take the issue of CO-2 storage that we told all parties about. Only D66 
adopted it. CPB did not think much of it, but we studied the matter and concluded it 
would be feasible: there is enough space, how much money it would cost is known 
and there have been pilots with the method. The fact that there could be social resis-
tance against it, leads to some remarks in our texts, we hint at it”.69 
The quote above indicates that some RIVM staff actively presented options to the politi-
cal parties. It appears that this is not a consistent pattern, that there are individual differ-
ences between various RIVM staff in terms of style. Some are more advisory orientated; 
others play the role of referee. The latter implies a greater role for the parties themselves: 
“Initially they asked us to select options for them: please do what is best for us. We 
felt uncomfortable in the situation. We have a certain relationship; we must take care 
not to end up being a political advisor to a party. This is possible if your counterpart 
is simply open to every idea, or has a huge bag of money”.70 
“We were sharp when it came to the answers to political parties; we saw our role as 
evaluators not as advisors. … If the parties said they wanted to connect to current 
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policies, then we did show them what the measures were that were connected to this 
idea. We showed packages of measures”71. 
Obviously, the risk of RIVM influence on political parties is lesser when the style of 
RIVM staff is more one of a referee than one of a consultant. Despite that being the case, 
it is easy to foresee that the process has a great potential to result in a convergence of 
plans amongst political parties. Some of the experts involved: 
“There may be a risk of all manifestoes becoming more alike, take the issues of 
charges, they receive more and more attention. At RIVM we have a range of options 
and all parties pick their preferred shape and form. This effect may occur over 
time.”72 
“Working with a party like Groen Links implies that the instruments that the CPB 
are stretched to their maximum capability, this sometimes leads to eye openers, to a 
mutual learning process although the RIVM is more active in supporting parties than 
the CPB. Groen Links has moved more towards financial instruments”.73 
In light of the information presented in this paragraph, it becomes interesting to ask the 
question about structuration. Does the bureaucratic discourse, that is strongly present in 
the rules that are supposed to guide the calculation process indeed steer it or is the way 
the process occurs more a reflection of another discourse? That is the question I present 
in the next paragraph. 
4.3 Trespassing boundaries: technocracy, not bureaucracy 
My conclusion from comparing the RIVM’s work in the case of election manifestoes is 
that the bureau’s approach comes closest to the ‘technocracy’ model. Although it is true 
that none of the parties involved advocates replacement of politicians with experts, the 
desire to discipline politicians is undeniable. Most of the interviewees indicate that poli-
ticians are irresponsible to some degree, be it by promising contradictory goals or by hid-
ing the costs of their manifestoes: 
“Yes the calculation filters out unfounded promises; politicians have a tendency to 
use slogans and to simply shout stuff. So it is good that someone asks: those wind-
mills, how do you pay for them, where will you put them?” 74. 
“Politicians have a tendency to highlight the stronger points of their manifestoes and 
hide the weaker points. In the calculation process you really have to prove your  
assertions” 75. 
The calculation of election manifestoes can be seen as an attempt to discipline political 
parties, to make them stick to the goals of environmental policy as they have basically 
stood since 1989 or to make the goals even more stringent. This break of the authority 
rule arises because parties can get a favorable discussion from the RIVM by introducing 
                                                   
71
  Mr. Ligtvoet, Bilthoven, 8 September 2004. 
72
  Mr. Honig, Bilthoven, 8 September 2004. 
73
  Mr. Okker, Den Haag, 11 August 2004. 
74
  Mr. Irrgang, The Hague, 12 August 2004. 
75
  Mr. Honig, Bilthoven, 8 September 2004. 
Calculating the political  37
more stringent goals, by adding instruments and by adding money to the budget for envi-
ronmental measures. There is no attempt to start discussing the goals and in that sense, 
RIVM staff feels free to impose their understanding of the public good. 
Typical for this is the way the interaction process between RIVM and politicians starts. 
RIVM sends them a note, the ‘Note on policy shortages Nature and Environment in 
2010’76. This note indicates the areas where additional policy measures should be taken 
to stay on course of previously set government targets. In response this conclusion, 
RIVM staff indicated that various environmental goals are binding because of interna-
tional treaties and secondly that the RIVM is there to map the balance that is struck  
between ecology-economy and social quality77. 
Furthermore, as an information rule, ‘values’ are dealt with in the calculation exercise by 
reducing them to measurable units (concretization) and in the process, a strong distinc-
tion is made between ‘merely’ intentional statements and ‘actual’ measures. I presented 
the following statement to the interviewees: 
“In operationalizing the manifesto, the vision that a party has in regard of environ-
mental problems is moved to the background, there is no room for this vision in the 
discussions with the RIVM”. 
Of the seven RIVM staff I interviewed and that replied to this statement, only one agreed 
to this statement. Of the seven non-RIVM staff that replied, three agreed (see next para-
graph). I tend to support the position of those who agree to this statement. This because 
in the process, a strong distinction is made between ‘merely’ intentional statements and 
‘actual’ measures, which reduces visions to sets of measures, whereas they are funda-
mentally broader. 
“Some items or statements have political meaning, but RIVM interprets such state-
ments as meaning nothing. It is sometimes of political relevance to say something in 
a certain way, but not according to the RIVM. The issue at stake is the one of sym-
bols, or imagery. Take the issue of deposits on bottles. It may have little environ-
mental impact, but for the mentality of the population it may be very important. 
There is a difference between the political work and the RIVM”78. 
In the process, the ideological component has a tendency to disappear, at least to some of 
our interviewees: 
“In making visions concrete, these may indeed move to the background. Parties tend 
to come with similar measures regardless of ideological differences. The vision has 
not disappeared, but in practice it does not matter a great deal. One can not escape 
this because on the basis of visions we would not know what to calculate, it has to be 
quantified” 79. 
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The opposite position is also found amongst our interviews. Several of them find the cal-
culation process a way to bring the differences between the parties into focus more 
sharply. 
“The calculation exercise forces parties not to abandon their vision but rather to 
make their views more concrete”.80 
A matter worth mentioning here is how RIVM staff see the role of their own political  
affiliations in the process. I have not systematically studied this but the issue did come 
up in one of the interviews I had: 
“I am a party member myself but I know how to separate these issues. I have been 
open about it to my supervisors.”81  
Party membership is thus considered worth mentioning internally, but largely seen as a 
private matter. I found no indications that the politicians involved are greatly interested 
in the party backgrounds of RIVM. Says one of the people involved from the side of the 
political parties: 
“I have never had the feeling that the RIVM had a predetermined opinion, that would 
be strategically silly because one never knows which parties are in control after the 
elections”.82 
Does this then mean that RIVM is value-neutral? Not necessarily: 
“We are the Environment and Nature Assessment Office, this gives us a certain view 
on the world, the parties know this beforehand. I do have the illusion that I am  
unprejudiced, but you look at it from the nature and environment perspective’.[…] 
Nature management by farmers, it is an illusion to expect that this purports biodiver-
sity. The main target would be farming, but at some point there are limits…. The  
issue is highly politicized, we are being accused of making the EHS into a dogma”. 83 
4.4 Conclusion 
The similarity to the technocracy model is striking from the perspective that the RIVM is 
part of a bureaucracy, namely a Ministry. One would therefore be expecting that this 
model held greatest currency. To some extent this is true. The RIVM staff there does 
consist of knowledge workers that are hired at the service of political power. At least 
rhetorically, the institute places itself outside the realm of the issue of values in the case 
of calculating election manifestoes. It is clear that the potential tensions between CPB 
and RIVM are ‘solved’ by assigning turf to each other (RIVM stays out of economics, 
CPB out of environment – at least largely). Because of their status as public officials, 
RIVM staff enjoys privileges in terms of information that the ordinary public does not 
have (e.g. on Cabinet decisions). Also, it is clear that several of the larger political par-
ties (PvdA and VVD) consider the bureaucratic model more suitable for the RIVM and 
one of them (PvdA) appears to be convinced that that model describes the work of the 
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RIVM on election manifestoes in a suitable fashion. On the other hand, the RIVM staff 
is not involved in rule- or instruction making for implementing bodies, and the VVD 
clearly experiences the calculation work on its manifesto as a trespassing of the bureau-
cratic model. What distinguishes the RIVM most from the bureaucratic model however 
is the fact that the RIVM is not value neutral at all, but in fact acts as an enforcer of pre-
viously established stringent environmental policies, at least in this particular case. 
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5. Reflection 
5.1 Introduction 
In this final paragraph, I want to close this report by highlighting two topics. The first is 
the matter of evaluation. If indeed the calculation exercise fits the technocratic pattern, is 
that necessarily bad. The second topic is the one of the future direction for the RIVM, or 
more precisely the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP) as it is called 
since 2005. In my conversations with RIVM staff, they have indicated what they saw as 
the direction ahead for the RIVM in terms of the models introduced in the theoretical 
framework of this report. I will discuss the backgrounds of the technocratic nature of the 
calculation work and then assess whether the desired model for RIVM holds any prom-
ise. 
5.2 Evaluation 
For my evaluation of the calculation process, I rely on three sources. The first is an 
evaluation done by the RIVM itself. Secondly, I have presented almost all of my inter-
viewees84 a set of statements that are intended to evoke their thoughts on the calculation 
work. Finally, the theoretical framework introduced several ‘new’ evaluation criteria that 
I will use to assess performance of the RIVM in this particular case. 
RIVM questionnaire 
The RIVM undertook an evaluation of the project afterwards by means of sending a 
questionnaire to those involved. One set of questions was intended to gauge the general 
satisfaction of those involved, another is the vision that those involved have of the func-
tion of the exercise, and a third topic is ways to improve the calculation work. 
The RIVM-staff involved indicated that they had felt that the calculation exercise had 
been an interesting project. The remarks from the political parties are generally positive 
too. It is interesting but probably very humane to see them make various remarks about 
proposals for measures made by competing parties, that to their mind are not sufficiently 
criticized by the RIVM. The people involved appear to have held different expectations 
about the function of the calculation work. One RIVM expert clearly assumed a one-way 
learning experience for the political parties.  
“The direct interaction with the political parties was stimulating. I had the impres-
sion that the parties have learned a lot from the exercise”85. 
This impression is reinforced by his remark that 
“Our idea to fill the shop window with instruments and then let the parties chose, has 
not worked […]. Parties tended to indicate rather vaguely what they wanted 
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(whereas the instruments in the window shop are very concrete) or (especially Green 
Left) they chose instruments that were not in the window shop”86. 
The representative of the Christian Union also used learning metaphor: 
“The value of the report is not only in attention and publicity, but also in a learning 
process and having to motivate certain choices”87.  
The Social Democrats however saw their relationship with the RIVM differently. One of 
them remarked that the RIVM: 
“Has made a good effort to judge political formulations, that are not always quanti-
fiable. Real conclusions have not been reached, but that was not the purpose of the 
exercise. The RIVM’s role is to gather the facts (based or not on models or expert 
judgment) and leave the conclusions to the voter”88. 
Remarkably, the RIVM staff is not convinced that they were sufficiently able to take  
political visions into account, whereas representatives of political parties say the oppo-
site. The RIVM expert that was just quoted: 
“a weak point in the exercise to my mind is the scoring of visions. If you, as a politi-
cal party are aware of which measures score well (buying up cattle, levies on pesti-
cides, subsidizing ecological agriculture), then the RIVM gives you many environ-
ment kudos. Whereas there are many ‘soft’ and non-calculable measures and  
visions”89. 
The social democrats and representative of the Christian Union however indicate satis-
faction about the possibilities for giving visions. They do however agree to the topic of 
predictability: 
“on the basis of the report building blocks National Environmental Policy Plan 4, the 
environmental balance, and the environmental outlook, we were able to predict the 
issues that would receive consideration”90. 
In terms of improvement, one RIVM member of staff indicated that he had felt a desire 
to access the election manifesto directly, rather than depending on what his colleague 
had gathered from the election manifestoes: 
“[…] another disadvantage is that as an assessor you loose sight of the program as a 
whole, you can in fact only judge measures if you know the manifesto as a whole”91. 
The political parties express a desire for even further going assessment. The Social  
Democrats’ representative, along side the Christian Union representative, highlights the 
issue of enforcement, which is indeed a weak issue in Dutch environmental policy. 
“Enforcement has not been discussed explicitly, whereas this is a condition sine qua 
non for successful policy”92. 
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The implicit recommendation here is that the RIVM should also ex ante assess the  
implementability and enforceability of policies. 
List of statements 
As part of my interviews with those involved, I have presented the interviewees a set of 
statements that they could agree or disagree to. In many cases, the interviewees gave fur-
ther comments and I have used these extensively throughout this text. However, I find 
that the analysis of the answers, when split across RIVM and non-RIVM staff, generates 
some interesting findings and I want to briefly discuss these outcomes. The statements I 
presented to the interviewees are as follows: 
Statement 1 Operationalization of election manifestoes is a good thing because it  
filters out unfounded election promises.  
Statement 2 Through operationalization, the political vision of a party on environ-
mental problems moves to the background, visions have no place in the discussions 
with the RIVM. 
Statement 3 Operationalization of election manifestoes is so much work that only the 
larger parties can afford it, and smaller parties are at a disadvantage. 
Statement 4 The RIVM never presses their own view of environmental problems on 
to political parties when operationalizing manifestoes. The RIVM operates in a value 
neutral fashion and that is the way it should be93.  
Statement 5 Operationalization makes the formation of government coalitions after 
elections easier.  
Statement 6 Operationalization diminishes variety because the parties choose simi-
lar policy options after consultations about what works and what does not. 
Statement 7 Political parties sometime ask the RIVM to fill in ‘policy discretion’. 
The RIVM then gives useful advice. 
Statement 8 Parties change the content of their manifestoes by operationalization. 
Statement 9 Parties are fully capable of explaining the operationalization to the 
voter. 
Statement 10 Operationalization is a matter for a small group of representatives of 
one party. However, they are fully capable to present the outcomes to the other 
members of the party94. 
The reader will see that most of the issues addressed in this report are presented in the 
statements. The figure below denotes the degree to which the interviewees agreed to the 
statements. The number of interviewees differs somewhat per question. This is partly 
due to the fact that not all interviewees felt capable of replying to all statements. In order 
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to see whether there were any differences in perceptions of the RIVM staff and the peo-
ple involved from the side of the political parties, I have analyzed the answers of these 
groups separately. Because of the small number of respondents, I have not endeavored to 
perform statistical analysis. The reader should also be aware that despite various  
attempts, it was impossible to interview a representative of two non-participating parties, 
the Lijst Pim Fortuyn and the Christian Democrats. This may result is a certain bias of 
the outcomes amongst interviewees from the political side towards the positive. 
 
Agreement 
For several statements (S1, S5, S7, S8, and S10), RIVM and non-RIVM staff answered 
in a more or less similar fashion. Statement 1 meets with broad agreement. This state-
ment is about the disciplining effect of the calculation exercise as it suggests that the cal-
culation process has the function of weeding out unfounded promises.  
Statement 5, which suggests that the calculation work is helpful in Cabinet formation  
after elections meets with relatively little agreement. I should add that several respon-
dents that did agree to the statement specified later that they thought the statement was 
truer for the CPB calculations than for the RIVM calculations. 
Statement 7, which suggests that the RIVM helps political parties devise measures and is 
of useful assistance meets with resounding approval. This fits the pattern sketched above 
and suggests that the predominant style of RIVM staff is advisory rather than as a refe-
ree. 
Statement 8 is about the question whether or not the election manifestoes are changed in 
the process of calculation. About half of the interviewees says that this is indeed the 
case, and this does not appear to be fundamentally different from RIVM and non-RIVM 
staff. 
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Statement 10 also meets with agreement from RIVM staff and non-RIVM staff alike. 
The statement points at the relatively small group of people involved, and to the fact that 
these people are able to communicate the outcomes to the rest of the party. It is a pity 
that this statement actually contains two statements. The agreement to the statement 
overall stems from the first bit, with most RIVM staff indicating that they can not judge 
whether or not the party people involved communicate outcomes to the rest of the party. 
Most party representatives also agreed to the second bit of the statement, but then one 
needs to keep in mind that not agreeing to this statement could be seen as a disqualifica-
tion of their own work. 
Varying degrees of agreement 
Perhaps more interesting from the perspective of boundary work are the statements 
where the RIVM staff and non-RIVM staff give varying degrees of agreement (S2, S3, 
S4, S6, and S9). 
Statement 2 is about the displacement of values in the calculation process. Only a small 
minority of RIVM staff sees this occurring, but almost half of the interviewees from the 
political spectrum agree that this happens. 
Statement 3 is about the position of small parties. Here too only a small fraction of 
RIVM staff sees a problem with the potentially disadvantageous position of small par-
ties, whereas a large majority of the political representatives saw this problem. 
Statement 4 is about the value neutral character of the work that RIVM staff do in the 
course of calculating election manifestoes. Here a large majority of RIVM staff agree 
that they operate in a value neutral fashion, but only a small minority of the interviewees 
from the political spectrum agree. 
Statement 6 is about the uniforming character of the calculation work. Whereas only one 
third of the RIVM staff sees this happening, about two thirds of the non-RIVM staff 
thinks this is the case. 
Statement 9 finally is about the ability to communicate the outcomes of the exercise to 
the voter. Not many RIVM staff were able to answer this statement, but the majority had 
a positive idea about this. A large majority of the interviewees from the political side 
however disagreed to the statement, with about 85% of the interviewees suggesting that 
the outcomes cannot be communicated to the voter. 
Interpretation 
On the whole, RIVM staff are more positive about the calculation work than their politi-
cal counterparts. They are more optimistic about the possibilities to explain the outcomes 
to the voter, which is in fact the role politicians would have in a technocratic discourse, 
they consider themselves more neutral than politicians do, they don’t see displacement of 
values as much as the politicians do, don’t think the calculation work will work to erase 
differences between parties and don’t consider small parties to be at a disadvantage as 
much as the political interviewees do.  
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The criteria specified in the theoretical framework 
It is clear that in the case of the RIVM (at least the calculation of election manifestoes) 
co-construction of policy and science takes place. The RIVM itself has played an impor-
tant role in underpinning environmental policies and these policies are an important part 
of the raison d’être for the RIVM. The relevant criteria for judging boundary work under 
this condition were: the selective consideration of knowledge, the treatment of compet-
ing scientific approaches, and the exclusion of viable policy options a priori. Looking 
from those criteria, the calculation exercise could be vulnerable in the sense that the 
RIVM uses mainly its own expertise in the calculation exercise. Competing scientific 
approaches are not addressed openly but indoor and then only for matters where the  
institute feels it is a relatively outsider (water management). Whether or not the RIVM 
excludes viable policy options is difficult to say. The RIVM does decide to some extent 
over what is realistic and what is not. A rather radical idea such as an open space charge 
is the calculated, whereas other measures are not calculated. It does seem however that 
the RIVM’s work may result in a certain level uniformity amongst the parties involved, 
plus the desire to help the voter may turn the voter into a ‘lazy voter’ and may make the 
media lazy as well. For certain, independent critical societal debate is not stimulated in 
this fashion. 
5.3 Looking ahead 
The RIVM is no stranger to boundary work. Hajer (1995) described how the institute, 
together with the Department of the Environment and helped by a wave of public con-
cern over environmental matters support, played an important role in the formulation of 
environmental policy goals in the Netherlands. The institute played an important role in 
connecting environmental problems that were previously considered to be separate and 
by introducing policy goals on the basis of the concept ‘carrying capacity’. Many of the 
goals of the first National Environmental Policy Plan (1989) are still standing, and their 
deadline (often 2010) is approaching. Officials at RIVM indicated that in their percep-
tion, the RIVM played the role of environmental advocate in the 1980s. As part of their 
desire to equal CPB in terms of status and importance, the RIVM (at least its environ-
mental section) developed a desire to obtain ‘Planning Bureau’ status, which it obtained 
in 1994. With this new status belongs a new role for the RIVM according to these offi-
cials, more neutral, less aimed at advocacy95. When presented with the full typology as 
developed by Hoppe (2002), high ranking RIVM officials indicated they were looking 
for a move towards what Hoppe called the ‘policy-learning model’. This indication is  
interesting because of the four ‘moderate’ models described by Hoppe, this particular 
one is closest to the extreme end of technocracy.  
What does the policy-learning model encompass? It differs from technocracy in the fact 
that it assumes the possibility of dialogue between policy makers and experts, “all actors 
are constructed as scholars, in one sense, engaged in a process of social learning 
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through social debat” (ibid, 41). Policy programs in this model are sets of hypotheses 
about collective action and outcomes in the real world and are intended as experiments. 
The policy-learning model, according to Hoppe, implies a certain degree of shared spe-
cialization in a certain area of government activity (like environmental policy). Experts 
and policymakers in such a field are expected to collectively develop hypotheses and  
experiments from a shared set of assumptions and beliefs, some of them very fundamen-
tal (normative core), others more instrumental and a ‘heuristic layer’ that provides for 
increased problem capacity. Policy orientated learning in teams of like-minded politi-
cians, administrators and experts is supposed to be possible. The policy learning model 
calls for professional platforms for technical communities in policy subsystems and  
mutual trust between experts and policymakers (ibid.: 46). 
Reflecting upon this description I find the terms social learning and social debate too 
broad for what Hoppe describes. First of all, I would consider learning amongst members 
of a policy community a quite meager interpretation and cannot see why social learning 
and debate should not involve interest groups and ordinary citizens. Secondly I do not 
see why social learning should be essentially limited to the outer shell(s) of the belief 
systems of particular policy communities, I would consider social learning and debate 
about the core values of such a community more beneficial than learning at the fringes. 
Armed with the just described model plus additions and RIVM’s desire in mind I take a 
look at the way the calculation of election manifestoes could take place in the future.  
After that, I broaden the discussion somewhat by looking at the hurdles and possibilities 
that can be derived from the calculation exercise for the broader change agenda towards 
a policy-learning model by the RIVM. 
In terms of the calculation exercise, I find a statement of one of my interviewees a good 
starting point. He said the following: 
“Parties always use experts in the course of preparing election manifestoes, for in-
stance professors that are linked to them. That is not transparent at all, so what is 
the alternative for calculations by the RIVM?”96 
Implicit in this statement is the assertion that the calculation by the RIVM adds a certain 
degree of transparency to the preparation of election manifestoes. I agree to the impor-
tance of transparency but cannot agree that the way RIVM currently undertakes its calcu-
lation is transparent; in fact, as far as the preparation of a party manifesto should be  
regarded as a task for a political party itself, RIVM potentially undermines the mecha-
nisms available in the political parties to secure a transparent process. In my opinion 
there are two ways of going about this. The first is to actually stop the calculation work 
completely and retreat to the normal tasks that the institute has in policy processes, 
which are largely related to the monitoring of policy progress. It is clear from the com-
ments of the interviewees of the political spectrum that they see RIVM as a potential ally 
in this task, especially vis-à-vis some of the larger ministries. 
“The added value of the exercise is that no unfounded promises are made in election 
manifestoes and that not only officials at the ministry check the feasibility of political 
proposals. We see some difference between the Ministry of Finance, where they are 
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  Mr. Van der Vlist, Den Haag, 11 August 2004. 
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very open, and the Ministries of Environment, Traffic and Water Management and 
Agriculture…. Compared to those ministries, the RIVM is a relief to work with”.97 
The second way would be to let go of the disciplining character and open the calculation 
exercise far more than currently (boundary rules, information rules) for political steering 
and steering by ngo’s or even ordinary citizens. Currently, the models that RIVM uses 
tend to structure the questions that are asked to the political parties, and it seems to me 
that this is an important factor that drives the process towards technocracy. Obviously, 
especially the quantitative models have their limitations but that is much less the case for 
the qualitative models that should be used more extensively when the process becomes 
steered more by the political parties. The answer to certain desires by political parties, 
such as the abolishment of the import of dirty power, could then consist of a collective 
puzzling exercise of how this goal could be achieved anyhow, despite legal hurdles such 
as the ones imposed by the European Union. Ngo’s could play a role in this, certainly if a 
rich variety of positions is maintained and for instance one ngo is included that is  
extremely in favour of nuclear power generation. As one of my interviewees said, this is 
about the debate behind the goals: 
“My background is the Ecological Main Structure, this is very important for biodi-
versity which RIVM finds crucial. All parties subscribe to it in their manifesto, 
whereas if one looks at the instruments applied … they are at odds with the goals. 
Behind it is an interesting debate. If a politician is not interested in biodiversity, if he 
says that the Netherlands should become a beautiful park … you start judging things 
very differently. But all parties themselves have this dogma in their manifesto.”98 
The advantage of the first way over the second is that the RIVM avoids difficult discus-
sions over its position in relation to Parliament. That is because if the RIVM opts for the 
second way, it runs the risk of being seen as a threat to Parliament as the forum for pub-
lic debate. This already leads to the more fundamental discussion on RIVM’s future  
position and what we can learn – of the possibly unique- case of calculating election 
manifestoes. Several elements transpire from the exercise of calculating election mani-
festoes. The first is that a certain dose of technocracy is apparently not considered very 
problematic by most of my interviewees. Therefore, in connection with the remarks 
about potential tensions with Parliament that I have just made, one would have to make 
sure that there is a clear demand for an RIVM role as an active participant and initiator 
of public debate. This demand may not be as big as one would think. Secondly, both the 
role of critical assessor of government policies and the role of stimulator of public debate 
would fit the policy-learning model (perhaps a very critical assessment of goals 
achievement in nature policy for instance is one of the best catalysts fro such debate), but 
they would require different capabilities from the RIVM. The first way, which is rela-
tively more an outsider approach, would probably fit better to the current apparatus of 
models and the capabilities of personnel. The second would probably not require much 
of the current model infrastructure, but more political skills of the RIVM. The example 
of calculating manifestoes shows that the skills and approaches of RIVM staff vary 
greatly and that this variation is at least partially responsible for a certain variation in  
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advisory style. A more uniform approach in line with de predominant approach to policy 
advice would probably be warranted if RIVM seriously pursues its new approach. 
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Appendix I. Interviewees 
 
Name Organization Place and date 
1 Biggelaar, mr. A. van den Stichting Natuur en Milieu (director) Utrecht,  
31 August 2004 
2 Brink, mr. C-J. RIVM Bilthoven,  
31 August 2004 
3 Egmond, N.D. van RIVM (director Environmental Branch) Bilthoven,  
13 September 2004 
4 Gerwen, mr. O-J. van RIVM (project leader calculator project 2002) Bilthoven,  
31 August 2004 
5 Irrgang, mr. E. Socialistische Partij, delegation to the Second 
Chamber of Parliament (assistant) 
Den Haag,  
12 August 2004 
6 Honig, mr. E. RIVM Bilthoven,  
8 September 2004 
7 Klein-Molenkamp, mr. J. VVD, former Member of Parliament Rhoon,  
8 September 2004 
8 Koppelaar, mr. R. Christen Unie, delegation to the Second Chamber 
of Parliament (assistant) 
Den Haag,  
30 August 2004 
9 Lammers, W. RIVM Bilthoven,  
13 September 2004 
10 Ligtvoet, mr. W. RIVM Bilthoven,  
8 September 2004 
11 Okker, mr. R. Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
(CPB) 
Den Haag,  
11 August 2004 
12 Pol, mr. R. PvdA, delegation to the Second Chamber of  
Parliament (assistant) 
Den Haag,  
7 September 
13 Stellingwerf, mr. D. Christen Unie, former Member of Parliament Ede,  
6 September 2004 
14 Streefkerk, mrs. M. Groen Links, delegation to the Second Chamber of 
Parliament (assistant) and party bureau 
Den Haag,  
1 September 2004 
15 Visser, mr. A. VVD, Member of Parliament Den Haag,  
9 September 2004 
16 Vlist, mr. M.J. Ministry of Environment, Spatial planning and 
Housing (VROM, Director General) 
Den Haag,  
11 August 2004 
17 Wieringa, mr. K. RIVM (project leader calculation project in ’94 and 
’98) 
Bilthoven,  
31 August 2004 
18 Zeijts, mr. H. van RIVM Bilthoven,  
31 August 2004 
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Appendix II. The process of calculating 
The judgment method for scoring the election manifestoes was generally the same as the 
method used in the ‘Environmental Outlook’ and more general assessment methods. 
Roughly speaking, this method connects econometric models to predictions about the 
development of certain economic sectors, via ‘spatial claims’, ‘activities of target 
groups’ and ‘emissions’, via environmental quality, to ‘the quality of surroundings’, ‘the 
state of nature, and finally ‘effects on health’ (see figure below). 
 
Figure adapted from RIVM (2000 a). Also see RIVM (2000b) 
 
The basic formula for calculating emissions (RIVM, 2000a) is the formula E (Emissions) 
= V (economy, demography and policy related) * K (technology, policy). Environmental 
policies come thus into play when the V (for volume) is calculated and when the K (units 
of emission per volume) are to be determined. Under V, the RIVM considers especially 
‘restrictive measures’ relevant, these are measures to control for instance the number of 
livestock on farms. Under K, the RIVM considers all government endorsed government 
measures that translate into ‘real technological or other measures to be implemented in 
the various sectors’ (ibid.: 13/14). Although the RIVM calculations are often open to dif-
ferent societal and economic future developments (different ‘futures’) that make space 
for diversity in assumptions about the future role of government, lifestyles, consumption 
patterns, etc., this is not the case in the election manifesto calculation exercise, where the 
CPB scenario and standing policies are translated into a ‘basic path’ (‘basispad’) with a 
quantitative assessment of the emissions as they are to be expected under these circum-
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stances. The proposals in the election manifestoes are then regarded as proposals for 
changing government policies with subsequent consequences in the V and K parts of the 
formula quoted above. Experts in certain fields (climate change, air pollution, traffic) - 
or rather the laboratories that they belong to - have their own ‘models’ of the relationship 
between E, V and K in their respective fields. The character of these models tends to be 
software with data from measuring points imputed in them, and in a limited number of 
cases it is not much more than a line of reasoning on how effective certain measures will 
be (expert judgment). The measuring data used in computer models are often limited in 
character in the sense that they cover only so much of the Dutch territory99. Very often, 
assumptions need to be made about situations where about no measurements are avail-
able. In the process of calculating emissions, i.e. noise data about the sources/causes and 
the population that is affected are also included (these are often approximations of the 
real’ situation as well) and these are used, together with the data from measurements to 
arrive at an assessment of impact. In the case of traffic noise for instance, the speed of 
vehicles is an important factor. If parties propose to set lower speed limits, this connects 
to a cause of noise disturbance in the model and is therefore assumed to have certain  
results. 
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